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The Constitution as Based on the
Consent of the Governed—Or,
Should We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?
At least twice in the last quarter century, well-known legalscholars have answered critics of the Supreme Court’s
modern fundamental rights decision making by posing what ap-
pears to be a descriptive question:  “Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?”1  In one case, the question is given an explicitly
affirmative and historical response:  It is alleged that the foun-
ders of the 1787 Constitution, despite claims to the contrary, did
not intend the Constitution to be an “interpretive” document.
On this view, the founding generation understood the Constitu-
tion as giving binding effect to “principles” of unwritten law that
established individual rights, garnered from either the natural
law by which government, and hence law, was justified, or to the
unwritten rights that were recognized under the English
constitution.2
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James E. Rogers Research Grant Foundation at the Boyd School of Law.
1 See, e.g. , Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? , 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 107, 107 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? ,
27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975).  In fairness to him, although Michael Moore poses
a seemingly descriptive question, leaning perhaps on the well-known preceding title,
he fully acknowledges that “the enterprise of answering the question is a normative
one.”  Moore, supra , at 107.  Even so, Moore’s emphasis is on the subject of consti-
tutional interpretation; I conceive the issue as concerning constitutional interpreta-
tion, but also as concerning the issue of designing and drafting constitutions.
2 See generally  Grey, supra  note 1.  As Professor Schauer has observed, in draft-
ing Roe , although Justice Blackmun listed “a number of possible textual sources for
the right [of privacy],” he “did not find it necessary to determine definitively which
[1245]
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The two major proponents of this reading of the Constitution
also brought a new force and power to another historical claim:
the written  Constitution itself, specifically in the text of the Ninth
Amendment, reportedly called for authoritative decision makers
to look beyond the text of the written Constitution and imple-
ment a body of unwritten rights.3  In fact, it was precisely this
reading of the Constitution, and the apparent acceptance of the
idea of an unwritten constitution, that senators relied upon in
justifying the rejection of the nomination of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court.4
of those sources was dispositive.”  Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations , 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 1297 n.8 (1997) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973)).  Grey’s thesis in support of a “noninterpretive” approach to constitutional
decision making was embraced by a significant number of constitutional law schol-
ars. See , e.g. , Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution , 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127 (1987); Michael J. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases:
A Functional Justification , 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981); David A.J. Richards, Sex-
ual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:  A Case Study in Human
Rights and the Unwritten Constitution , 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).  And Grey of-
fered additional support for the historical thesis as well.  Thomas C. Grey, Origins of
the Unwritten Constitution:  Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought ,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) [hereinafter Grey, Origins]; Thomas C. Grey, The Orig-
inal Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution [hereinafter Grey, Original Un-
derstanding], in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION:  SIX ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION 145 (Neil L. York ed., 1988).
3 See , e.g. , Grey, supra  note 1, at 716 (stating that “[t]he Ninth Amendment is the
textual expression of this idea [of higher law] in the federal Constitution”); Sherry,
supra  note 2, at 1161-67; see also CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS:  THE NINTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); 1 THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); 2 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); Laurence H. Tribe, Con-
trasting Constitutional Visions:  Of Real and Unreal Differences , 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 95 (1987); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment:  A
New Form of Guarantee , 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Eugene M. Van Loan III,
Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment , 48 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1968).  Advocates of
extra-textual judicial review, however, acknowledge that we have come to feel an
obligation to grab on to text to warrant human rights decision making.  So today we
are more likely “to read normative content into such general phrases in the Consti-
tution as ‘due process’ and ‘equal protection’ in order to prevent legislative infringe-
ment on individual rights the judges deem fundamental.”  Grey, Origins , supra  note
2, at 844 n.8.
4 See  Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment , 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1216-17 n.9 (1990) [hereinafter McAffee, Original Meaning].
When he visited my constitutional law class, Senator Paul Simon offered Bork’s “ig-
norance” of the original purpose of the Ninth Amendment as the central justifica-
tion for his rejection as a nominee.  The irony, of course, is that “text” and “history”
were being used to justify an approach to the Constitution that releases interpreters
from a commitment to either one, as the “sovereignty” of the Constitution’s makers
was used to warrant an approach that substitutes modern courts as decision makers
for those who embodied decisions in the text of the Constitution.
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Beyond the historical response to contemporary objections to
the modern Court’s role, another view is that these decisions can
be justified only “in the context of a theory of interpretation.”5
Here the answer is in the negative, as we are said to have a writ-
ten constitution; but there remains the question as to how it is
best understood.  On this view, the way to justify modern funda-
mental rights decision making, the sort ordinarily conceived as
“noninterpretive” or extra-textual, is to see such decisions as ef-
fective ways to make sense of the authoritative text we call the
Constitution.6  Even if “the grand clauses of the Constitution
possess greater vagueness than do most statutes,”7 we ought to
be wary of equating this vagueness with a running out of “mean-
ing” based on the lack of “authorial intentions” or “linguistic
conventions.”8  We need to see, in short, that meaning often de-
pends more on the reality we are describing than to any stipula-
tion to which author and audience may subscribe.9
The problem, says Moore, lies in the Constitution’s use of
terms that are “vague.”  Given that traditional theories of mean-
ing presume that meaning is associated with the conventions, in-
tentions, or beliefs of the users of language, or of their audience,
it appears that vague constitutional terms lack effective meaning
because “the speaker or the audience wouldn’t know what to say
about its application to a particular case.”10  The key break-
through, for Moore, is a recognition that “[t]he meaning of most
words used in a natural language such as English is not a function
of convention, intention, or belief,”11 for, to use his example,
“[s]omeone may be dead (or alive) even if conventional defini-
tions or examples of ‘death’ do not resolve the matter or they
resolve the matter wrongly.”12  If one is committed to the idea
5 See  Moore, supra  note 1, at 110; see generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter
FREEDOM’S LAW]; SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
(1993).
6 Thus Moore tells us that, under an appropriate and fitting theory of constitu-
tional interpretation, “it is not at all misleading or dishonest to claim that the only
authoritative text (‘law’) for any legitimate decisions, even Roe v. Wade , is the writ-
ten document itself.”  Moore, supra  note 1, at 123 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
7 Id.  at 130.
8 Id.  at 130-31.
9 Id.
10 Id.  at 127.
11 Id.
12 Moore, supra  note 1, at 128.
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that there is a moral reality that we can know,13 it becomes un-
problematic, according to Moore, to develop “a theory of inter-
pretation that constrains judicial judgment about the meaning of
a text as vague as the due process clause,” for the difference “be-
tween ‘liberty,’ in the fourteenth amendment, and ‘freedom of
speech’ or ‘free exercise’ of religion in the first amendment, is
surely a matter of degree.”14
In fact, a number of advocates of an essentially open-ended
“moral” reading of the Constitution believe that the terminology
employed by advocates of the “unwritten” Constitution confuses
central issues of constitutional interpretation.15  Thus, advocates
of unwritten constitutionalism often equated judicial efforts at
implementation with “noninterpretive” judicial review inasmuch
13 For skepticism about whether courts are likely to be successful at discerning the
requirements of the moral reality that is thought to inform our constitutional order,
see generally STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON
(1998).
14 Moore, supra  note 1, at 123.  It perhaps reflects a certain innocence on my part,
but I confess that I began this process some years ago thinking that we were address-
ing what was in fact mainly a legitimately descriptive question.  The question was
whether an “originalist” method of constitutional interpretation accurately de-
scribed the reality of our constitutional order, and I took the argument as being
centrally about whether it was cogent and meaningful to speak of collective intent at
all, given the difficulties involved with summing up the intentions of those who
drafted the Constitution. See  Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding , 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 213-17, 222-34 (1980); Thomas B. McAffee,
Reed Dickerson’s Originalism–What It Contributes to Contemporary Constitutional
Debate , 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 617, 625-30 (1992) [hereinafter McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s
Originalism].  For an analysis of whether the concept of looking for “original intent”
was hopelessly indeterminate, see Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indetermi-
nacy , 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429, 429 (1996) [hereinafter McAffee, Indetermi-
nacy] (stating that “[p]erhaps the most universal objection to originalism is that it is
impossible”).  For discussion of whether an “originalist” approach to constitutional
interpretation could be reconciled with the reality of our constitutional decisions and
practice and the doctrine of precedent, see Grey, supra  note 1, at 712-14, and
Thomas B. McAffee, Brown and the Doctrine of Precedent:  A Concurring Opinion ,
20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 99 (1995).  I am increasingly convinced, however, that there is no
method of constitutional interpretation free of problems.  Moreover, the central
question is the normative one:  What are the gains and losses to being bound by
decisions made by people at an earlier time whose decision making cannot be guar-
anteed directly to produce the best and most just society?
15 See , e.g. , RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 35 (1985); Andrzej
Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution:  The Problems
of Constitutional Interpretation , 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (1988); see also KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 164-65 (1999).  Even Professor Grey acknowledged
that in his initial article he “blurred together textualism and originalism under the
rubric of ‘interpretivism.’”  Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution ,
64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 211, 212 n.2 (1988).
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as “methods that employed natural law, contemporary morality,
or fundamental rights philosophy were seen as drawing from
outside the text and thus were not truly interpreting the text itself
but supplementing it with external principles in order to reach
judicial decisions.”16  It is fair to say that in recent years we have
seen a shift of focus “from whether to interpret the Constitution
to defining what ‘the Constitution’ is and how best to interpret
it.”17  Those who reject the noninterpretivist label contend that
“we do not have an unwritten constitution because we do not
need one; the written constitution we do have gives judges all the
room for activism that is required.”18
It is useful, however, to embrace continuity in describing basic
differences we have in giving effect to the Constitution, espe-
cially if particular ways of communicating help us convey and un-
derstand what is at stake.  The individual who originated the
term “non-interpretivist” to describe judicial review implement-
ing the unwritten constitution, for example, continues to believe
that the best approach to constitutional interpretation is not “tex-
tualist,” but is properly characterized as “supplemental.”19  In his
view, “much American constitutional adjudication, including but
not limited to decisions under due process liberty and the right of
privacy, involves the interpretation of an unwritten and essen-
tially common law constitution, which supplements the primarily
authoritative and essentially statutory written one.”20  Whatever
terminology is used, it is important that we realize that “common
law constitutionalists propose to use the cultural authority of the
text Constitution to legitimize the existence of an unwritten con-
stitution in which judges and other government officials create
constitutional meaning and norms.”21
There is little room for doubt that this notion of constitutional
interpretation reflects the modern American belief that the
meaning of the Constitution is appropriately altered as we gain
16 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 164.
17 Id.  at 165.
18 Grey, supra  note 15, at 212.  Grey has called such theorists “rejectionists,” in
that “they reject the distinction between written and unwritten sources of constitu-
tional law.” Id.  at 212 n.3.
19 Id.  at 211.
20 Id.
21 HERMAN BELZ, A LIVING CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW?:  AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 246 (1998).  The result is
that “judicial policy making is protected and privileged by identification with the
written Constitution.” Id.  at 249.
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increased understanding of the relationship citizens have with
their government.  Advocates of a moral reading of the Constitu-
tion generally believe that “the framers of the Constitution be-
lieved in unwritten higher law principles” and saw courts as
“authorized to enforce natural rights and expound doctrines not
found in the written Constitution.”22  The courts’ commission to
implement principles of natural law, on this view, evidences the
founding generation’s desire that the Constitution be an embodi-
ment of a social contract where the people bargained for a gov-
ernment that would “protect” their “inalienable” natural rights.23
An assumption is that this form of constitutionalism involves
“gradual, interpretive, and informal vehicles of change” and that
such change, being “more easily corrected as a method of consti-
tutional revision,” is “preferable to the Article V amendment
process.”24
This Article will assess these efforts at justifying the modern
Court’s role.25  In offering this evaluation, we will analyze histori-
cal and normative questions to review both what our constitu-
tional order has been, and should be, about.26  A thesis is that,
whether it is labeled unwritten constitutionalism or not, under
22 Id.  at 232.
23 See , e.g. , Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and
the Rights “Retained” by the People , 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 267-68 (1992) [hereinafter
McAffee, Social Contract Theory].
24 BELZ, supra  note 21, at 247.
25 For prior works offering a different perspective on the historical issues, see gen-
erally THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY—THE FOUNDERS’ UNDER-STANDING 10 (2000); Thomas B.
McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions:  The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights , 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 747 (2001) [hereinafter McAffee, Legal Enforceability]; Thomas B. McAf-
fee, Substance Above All:  The Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitution-
alists , 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501 (1995) [hereinafter McAffee, Substance Above
All]; Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate of the “Unwritten
Constitution” Thesis , 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 107 (1992) [hereinafter McAffee,
Prolegomena]; McAffee, Original Meaning , supra  note 4; see also  Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions , 102 YALE
L.J. 907 (1993); LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT:  DEMOC-
RACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1991); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natu-
ral Law in Early American Constitutionalism:  Did the Founders Contemplate
Judicial Enforcement of “Unwritten” Individual Rights? , 69 N.C. L. REV. 421 (1991).
26 While addressing these topics may seem like “old news” to some, given that the
debate over Judge Bork, to use an obvious example, occurred well over ten years
ago, a prominent American constitutional historian has more recently suggested that
“[m]ore perhaps than at any time in the twentieth century,” American constitutional
law “is characterized by tension between these theoretical models,” the ideas of
written and unwritten constitutionalism. BELZ, supra  note 21, at 11.
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the open-ended fundamental rights approach to constitutional
analysis that many would embrace, “the text of the Constitution”
is “a rhetorical symbol used to persuade the public of the legiti-
macy of judicial policy making.”27  Indeed, unwritten constitu-
tionalism becomes a way to link such a judicial role to the
historical American commitment to popular sovereignty.  Judges
play the central role because they were given this role by those
who drafted and ratified the Constitution.28
Apart from the “historical” nature of some of the arguments
advanced to defend the Court, it seems reasonably clear that
even though we are not universally committed to being bound by
an original understanding, some of our focus will need to be his-
torical.  We are trying to enlarge our understanding of the Amer-
ican system; one way to do that is to understand what those who
designed it, as well as those who have lived with it, did in making
sense of the system.  Even when our task is basically “descrip-
tive” in character, the answers we seek do not fall out automati-
cally.  Just the task of determining what our constitutional
practice and dominant thoughts about constitutionalism have
been is a tricky business, and it is not clear that answering these
basically descriptive questions will supply us with the correct an-
swer to the normative question that stands at the center of the
debate.  The result is that we must never forget that our ultimate
concern relates to the question of the direction in which we
should go and is therefore normative.  This Article is an attempt
to address these ultimate “oughts” of our constitutional order.
I
THE VALUE OF A “WRITTEN” CONSTITUTION
As Justice Paterson wrote:
It is difficult to say, what the constitution of England  is; be-
cause, not being reduced to written certainty and precision, it
lies entirely at the mercy of the Parliament:  it bends to every
governmental exigency; it varies and is blown about by every
breeze of legislative humour or political caprice.”  In contrast
to England where “there is no written constitution,” and
therefore, “nothing visible, nothing real, nothing certain,”
America has its constitution reduced to written exactitude and
27 Id.  at 10.
28 Id.  Another goal of this paper is to challenge the idea that criticism of such
decisions should “be dismissed as a partisan attack on an independent judiciary.”
Id.
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precision.29
And Richard Kay added:
Every other actor in the polity is subject to restraints created
and enforced by the state.  However, the state, as the holder of
legislative power, is itself subject to no constraint but that of
the constitution.  The constitution must, then, be understood
as a protection for every potential subject of state authority—
individuals, families, and groups.30
A. The Founders’ Views and the Message Embodied in
Their Text
There is no room for doubt that those who gave us the Consti-
tution believed in the importance of the written Constitution;
they thought it was important enough to make it one of the first
priorities after declaring independence to put their state constitu-
tions in writing.31  This decision reflected not only years of deal-
ing with written instruments of government, but equally the fact
that the lack of constitutional text was perceived as one of the
failures of the English constitution.  For the Americans, “revolt
supplied an extralegal remedy for the perceived tyranny visited
upon them.”32  A purpose of putting their constitutions in writ-
ing, then, was to make possible the permanent fixing of the terms
by which the people were to be governed.
As they made the transition to adopting the Federal Constitu-
29 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 52 (quoting Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795)).  The founding generation believed that one of the
problems was precisely that “[b]eing unwritten, the British constitution consisted of
a tradition of practice, general understandings, and occasional declarations.” Id.  at
50.  A framer of one of the first constitutions adopted, the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, stated that “[t]o deduce our rights from the principles of equity and justice and
the Constitution, is very well; but equity, justice, are no defence against power.”
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 293
n.56 (1969).
30 Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism , in CONSTITUTIONALISM:  PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 21 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) [hereinafter PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS].
31 In fact, late in 1775 the Continental Congress instructed the states to establish
independent governments by drafting constitutions. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORI-
GINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 100 (1988).  Consequently, in the first two
years following independence “eleven states drafted new constitutions, and one of
these states, South Carolina, drafted two.” DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15 (1990).  On the central relevance
of the American experience with written instruments, and its role in dictating the
move toward written constitutions, see MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 9-12.
32 MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 10.
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tion, they adopted the text we know as the Supremacy Clause,
which declared the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.33
Although the text they ratified could have been more explicit
about judicial power, the adoption of judicial review was the cor-
rect interpretation of the text of the Constitution.34
The founders believed, moreover, that they had advanced the
cause of meaningfully defining and limiting government by the
device of a written constitution.35  It has been argued that “[t]he
documentary text . . . expresses in modern form the view of class-
ical philosophy” that by putting it in writing we could preserve
wisdom “beyond the demise of the wise founder.”36  Indeed, in
33 Sherry, supra  note 2, at 1147-50 (observing that the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion itself, as opposed to federal legislation, was not added to the Supremacy Clause
until August 23, 1787).  As Julius Goebel has observed, by the Supremacy Clause
laws repugnant to the Constitution were “excluded from the imperative of obedi-
ence,” and the clause “was directed equally at any law-making body and at all
judges, the ultimate arbiters of enforcement and of enforceability.” JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 239 (1971).
34 For a small sampling of the works showing that the founding generation would
hardly have been surprised by the reading of judicial review as an important feature
of the new Constitution, see MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 62-66; BELZ, supra  note 21,
at 24-25 (finding that “[n]ot explicitly stated but implied in the judicial article was
the idea that the superior force of the Constitution depended on its application and
interpretation by the courts”); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SU-
PREME COURT 69-74 (1985); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
(1969); McAffee, Prolegomena , supra  note 25, at 164-69; and William Van Alstyne,
The Idea of the Constitution as Hard Law , 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 174, 177 (1987).  His-
torically, an important contribution of American constitutional law was its effective
establishment of a higher law “in the technical sense that it cannot be abrogated or
changed by normal legislative procedure.”  Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and
Individual Rights in the 18th Century Constitution , in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING—
ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 159 (J. Jackson Barlow et al.
eds., 1988).  This creation of a special category of legal norms that the British consti-
tution lacked was accomplished by giving the higher law roots in a document that
proceeded from the people—the fountain of all political power.  In thus reducing
the higher law (whether “fundamental law” or philosophical “natural law,” if distin-
guished at all) to positive constitutional law—what German authors call “Positivier-
ing des Naturrechts” (“transforming natural law into positive law”)—America put
into political practice what had been only a dissenting theory and revolutionary doc-
trine as to British constitutionalism.
35 See  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).  Professor Rich-
ard S. Kay has referred to two “defining features of American constitutionalism,”
one of them being that the way of “confining [government’s] exercise to proper
uses” is “the promulgation and enforcement of positive law.”  Kay, supra  note 30, at
19.  The American constitution-makers, says Kay, were “convinced of the unique
effectiveness  of written law.” Id.  at 40 (emphasis added).
36 BELZ, supra  note 21, at 5 (quoting WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, CONSTITUTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 26 (3d ed. 1968)); see also id.  at 20 (quoting BENJAMIN
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the framers’ minds the transition to a written constitution
marked the change to imposing meaningful limits on govern-
ment.37  In Marbury , Justice Marshall reminded us that “[t]he
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written.”38
A critical element in all of this was the idea that part of “the
genius of a written constitution lies precisely in its legal  charac-
ter; unlike the more ethereal and elusive constitutions of coun-
tries such as England, our written and legal Constitution can be
enforced just like other legal instruments such as statutes or con-
tracts.”39  The significance of the Constitution as an object for
interpretation “is closely linked to the Constitution’s status as a
legal text, and that status itself has been an important part of the
FLETCHER WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787, at 10 (1958) (stating
that the English constitution was seen as “ultimately existing in men’s minds and
premised on the idea that ‘thinking makes it so,’” whereas America’s constitutions
“rested on the idea of ‘saying makes it so,’ or at least the hope that putting some-
thing in writing so it can be authoritatively consulted makes it easier to achieve
specified ends”)).
37 In the framers’ minds, it was clear that “[t]he difference between premodern
and modern constitutionalism was that the former was mainly customary and only
incidentally documentary, while the latter was mainly documentary and incidentally
customary.” BELZ, supra  note 21, at 3.  According to one modern historian, “[t]he
great benefit of having a documentary constitution, it was believed, was to make
practicable the enforcement of principles, norms, and rules limiting government.  A
customary or unwritten constitution, consisting of convention, practice, and usage,
was thought to be not a real constitution because it was not enforceable against
government.” Id.
38 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.  It has been observed that “[i]n the three pages of
Marshall’s opinion in which he lays out his core argument for judicial review, he
refers to the specifically written nature of the U.S. Constitution no less than eight
times, including describing the reduction of constitutions to writings as ‘the greatest
improvement on political institutions.’” WHITTINGTON, supra note 15, at 240 n.39.
This was also the basis for justifying judicial review as advocated in The Federalist , as
well as other leading voices supporting judicial review during the period leading to
the ratification of the Constitution.  The “constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also BELZ,
supra  note 21, at 250; MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 58-66; Kay, supra  note 30, at 27-
28.
39 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 47; see also  Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 180 (con-
trasting American Constitution with many that “are simply not ‘law’ as we under-
stand it in the United States” and hence lack “cash value” and may simply “vanish in
the night”).  Even an advocate of a broad judicial power to implement fundamental
rights has acknowledged that Marbury ’s defense of judicial review was “permeated
with reliance on the ‘writtenness’  of the Constitution.”  Thomas C. Grey, The Consti-
tution as Scripture , 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1984).
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argument for judicial review.”40  For example, by contrast to our
Federal Constitution, the declarations of rights that were part of
written constitutions of the states were stated in terms of what
government “should” do; consequently they “were treated as
hortatory rather than legally binding.”41
Even in an era of skepticism about the value of a historical and
written constitution it remains true that “the basic pattern of
American constitutionalism” is “one of conflict within consen-
sus.”42  Even if we do not like the limits the Constitution im-
poses, we accept them because we have come to value the larger
system of government the Constitution embodies.43  This is at
least in part because modern Americans accurately perceive that
“[t]he founding required rational discussion, deliberation, com-
promise, and choice; consent, concurrence, and mutual pledg-
ing,” and the result was a government that took its written
constitution seriously and paid attention to “substantive princi-
ples of natural rights, consent, and limited and balanced
power.”44  A result has been that “constitutional scholars from
John Marshall to John Ely have focused on and attached great
significance to the fact that American constitutions are written
documents.”45  In general, though, even self-described textualists
look at more than just the text—rather, they “seek to braid argu-
40 Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide for the Perplexed , 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1085, 1101 (1989).
41 BELZ, supra  note 21, at 21.  This approach to such provisions was consistent
with intent of their drafters, given that they were stated as principles and did not use
mandatory language.  McAffee, Legal Enforceability , supra  note 25, at 754-78.
42 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF:  THE CONSTITU-
TION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 29 (1986).
43 See BELZ, supra  note 21, at 6.
44 Id.  at 37.
45 Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States , 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (1992).
Indeed, the centrality of the text seems to be the most fundamental constitutional
question that divides those who explicitly advocate an “unwritten” constitution on
historical grounds from those who advocate the same results by using constitutional
text. See , e.g. , Moore, supra  note 1, at 113 (stating that “no one should wish to
defend a non-text-based view of constitutional law”); id.  at 123 (“[Justice Hugo]
Black’s constitution—the one he was so fond of pulling out of his pocket—is our
only Constitution.”).  But even among those who rely on the text as justifying open-
ended constitutional decision making, there is a tendency to read the historical
materials as revealing a decision in favor of this outcome. See , e.g. , BARBER, supra
note 5, at 157-60, 171-78; Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment:  Inkblot or
Another Hard Nut to Crack? , 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (1988); Moore, supra  note 1,
at 137-38 (arguing that a court “attempting to discover what ‘liberty’ means in the
fourteenth amendment—either by itself or as incorporating the unenumerated rights
of the ninth amendment—is not necessarily engaged in an impossible task”).
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ments from text, history, and structure into an interpretive rope
whose strands mutually reinforce.”46
B. The Views of Advocates of the “Historical”
Unwritten Constitution
Modern advocates of the unwritten constitution on historical
grounds, however, have argued that although we read Justice
Marshall to say that the Constitution’s “writtenness” is what
gives it its paramount authority,47 a “textual constitutionalist”
judge48 has adopted a “profoundly positivist attitude towards
fundamental law” that “is a relatively modern invention.”49
While it is indisputable that Marshall believed in supplementing
the written Constitution with what he deemed principles of un-
written fundamental law, he also gave the concept of a written
constitution a central role in justifying the doctrine of judicial re-
view.  This is why a number of modern scholars, most notably
Professor Grey, have called our attention to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Calder v. Bull ,50 precisely because its emphasis on un-
written principles can be sharply contrasted with Marbury ’s em-
phasis on the written Constitution and the sovereign power of
the people.51  It is useful to recognize, however, that the framers
46 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:  The Document and the Doctrine , 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 31 (2000).  This is why, understood in this way, textualism “is woven into
the fabric of conventional constitutional interpretation.” Id.  at 34.
47 Id.
48 A “textual constitutionalist” has been defined as “any judge who relies on the
written Constitution as the sole source of fundamental law, whatever method of in-
terpretation is used to elucidate that most impenetrable document.”  Sherry, supra
note 2, at 1171 n.188.
49 Sherry, supra  note 45, at 171.  Sherry concludes that “[t]extualism is not an
inevitable concomitant of a written constitution, and it is not a reflection of our
earliest national heritage.” Id.  at 222.  Interestingly, however, the recent debate on
the subject of constitutional and legal interpretation supplies a decidedly mixed pic-
ture about the merits of the assumption that text  plays a critical role in the interpre-
tive process. See , e.g. , Schauer, supra  note 2, at 1295-98.  And, of course, the
arguments favoring the most expansive readings of the individual rights guarantees
of the Constitution typically rely most heavily on the nature of the constitutional
text. See infra  notes 57-99 and accompanying text.
50 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386 (1798).
51 See  Grey, Original Understanding , supra  note 2, at 708; see also GERALD GUN-
THER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455-57 (13th ed. 1997).  Gun-
ther and Sullivan concluded that “Marshall’s rationale for judicial authority in
Marbury v. Madison helped assure that Iredell’s position, not Chase’s, would
emerge as the dominant one:  a justification for judicial review that relied so heavily
on the implication of a written constitution probably found it more congenial to
justify any invalidations on the bases of explicit constitutional restraints.” Id.  at
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were not merely positivists,52 but were perceptive enough to rec-
ognize that the value of having a written constitution could all
too readily be lost by the very process of interpretation.53  Jeffer-
son wrote that “[o]ur peculiar security is possession of a written
constitution.  Let us not make it a blank paper by
construction.”54
Yet modern advocates of the historical “unwritten Constitu-
tion” thesis have offered us this precise alternative.55  Their con-
cern is that if the written Constitution is taken seriously, it might
block a judge’s attempt to do justice.  Finding that early Virginia
courts drew “upon a rich tradition of natural rights,” Professor
Sherry concludes that “they combined reason, history, and judg-
456-57.  Modern advocates of unwritten constitutionalism would undoubtedly insist
that the distinction is more formal than substantive and suggest that unwritten prin-
ciples have continued to play a significant role, albeit not as clear and explicit a one
as might have occurred.  There is no question, however, that the rationale for judi-
cial review articulated in Marbury , and defended at length in The Federalist , No. 78,
played a critical role in developing the thought that courts had a central role to play
in the drama of our constitutionalism. See MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 49-50, 61-66.
52 During the ratification struggle, for example, advocates of a bill of rights con-
tended that “a constitution does not in itself imply any more than a declaration of
the relation which the different parts of the government bear to each other, but does
not in any degree imply security to the rights of individuals.”  Letter to the Massa-
chusetts Convention (Jan. 29, 1788), reprinted in  4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST 106, 108 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  There is no question that ratification-era
proponents of a bill of rights believed that natural rights had to be secured in civil
law to be constitutional rights. See McAffee, Prolegomena , supra  note 25, at 128-34;
Hamburger, supra  note 25, at 908, 930-37.
53 There is little room for doubt that prominent framers of our Constitution and
Bill of Rights, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, justified a written bill
of rights partly on the basis of the “legal check” that “it puts into the hands of the
judiciary.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), re-
printed in  1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY 620, 620 (1971); see also  McAffee, Prolegomena , supra  note 25, at 164-69;
McAffee, Legal Enforceability , supra note 25, at 769-71.  This is at least one reason
that the text of the Ninth Amendment has loomed so large in the “unwritten Consti-
tution” debate; if that text supports the concept of looking for rights beyond the
text, non-textualists can claim a sanction for their views in the text of the Constitu-
tion itself (as well as in statements by Jefferson and Madison favoring judicial review
to protect constitutional rights).  Otherwise, the enforcement of unenumerated
rights generates limitations on government without the “legal check” of the text of
the Constitution to lend support to the project.
54 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 17, 1803), quoted
in  Kay, supra  note 30, at 28.
55 Unwritten constitutionalism presents us with an “agenda for additional, un-
grounded judicial activism that is even less encumbered than the current—and often
strained—excessive efforts to do good.”  William Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward
Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment , 91 YALE L.J. 207, 216 (1981).
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ment to grapple with the issues that came before them.”56  Even
though modern courts might not address or resolve these issues
in precisely the same way, Sherry concludes that “their commit-
ment to doing justice might be worth emulating.”57  The critical
point about the unwritten constitution was that it opened the
door to giving decisive weight to judges’ views of “‘the funda-
mental laws of England,’ the ‘law of nations,’ Magna Carta, ‘com-
mon right and reason,’ ‘unalienable rights,’ and ‘natural
justice.’”58 The main idea of unwritten constitutionalism for to-
day, then, is to read the text of the Constitution we have as a
grant of power to judges to enforce ideas of justice and natural
rights without the limitations or restrictions that some would
read from the text.
By contrast, traditionally we have looked to the “balances of
constitutional text” as a means “to retain the choices and com-
promises written into the Constitution by the people.”59  A gov-
erning assumption is that we should not “look past the
Constitution to a larger and prior moral commitment.”60  A re-
lated starting point is that
[j]udges gain their authority by their institutional obligation to
enforce the law established by the people against the repre-
sentatives of the people, not by possessing special insight into
the nature of the moral universe or by being situated so as to
expand democratic values at the expense of existing represen-
tative institutions.61
On this view, the attempt to pursue a moral constitution in disre-
gard of the written text “would represent a fundamental usurpa-
tion by the judiciary of powers not granted to it under the
Constitution and a perversion of the constitutional enterprise.”62
Some have contended for unwritten principles that supplement
the text of the written document, while others have argued for a
view of unwritten principles that supplant  the written Constitu-
tion—at least to the extent that there is any conflict.63  But it is
56 Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation , 53
ALB. L. REV. 297, 326 (1989).
57 Id.
58 Id.  at 300.
59 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 44.
60 Id.
61 Id.  at 46.
62 Id.  at 47.
63 See MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 19-24; cf.  Moore, supra note 1, at 115.  In my
own work, for example, I have separated the work of Tom Grey, as one who ac-
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unclear that the distinction makes any ultimate difference.64
Even if the text of the Constitution serves as an express barrier
that prevents recognition of some fundamental rights, if it re-
mains true that the Ninth Amendment secures the entirety of the
human rights that moral thought supplies, to the extent that the
text of the Constitution does not expressly prevent it, we still
have effectively made the written Constitution “a blank paper by
construction.”65
At least as critically important is that the “freedom” given to
judges by unwritten constitutionalism could as easily lead to judi-
cial decisions undercutting our freedoms as it could to decisions
expanding that freedom.66  The classic historical example is the
Supreme Court decision in the Slaughter-House Cases .67  In that
knowledges that the Constitution as originally drafted authorized the institution of
human slavery, from that of Suzanna Sherry, who says that under the early state
constitutions most of the framers denied the authority of the people to amend the
Constitution in a way that violates natural rights. See , e.g. , MCAFFEE, supra  note
25, at 3, 19-24.
64 The point is that whether one looks to a perceived moral reality or to one’s
perception of what has become fundamental to the American people, there is noth-
ing unequivocal, in the text or otherwise, to tell someone when it is time to stop.
Even Professor Dworkin, who makes no specific claim that the founders sought to
constitutionalize natural rights, and who emphasizes the text’s role in justifying a
moral reading of the Constitution, contends that “the best explanation of the differ-
ing patterns of [judges’] decisions lies in their different understandings of central
moral values embedded in the Constitution’s text.” FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5,
at 2.  The question is necessarily centered on whether the “general principles of lib-
erty that are embedded in the Constitution’s abstract language and in the Court’s
past decisions” prohibits anti-abortion legislation. Id.  at 127; cf.  Michael W. Mc-
Connell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review:  A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution , 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1270
(1997) (concluding that Dworkin thus insists “that text, history, and unwelcome pre-
cedent must be interpreted at a sufficiently abstract level that they do not interfere
with the judge’s ability to make the Constitution ‘the best it can be’”).  The conse-
quence is that, as Professor McConnell observes, “in all of Dworkin’s writings I am
unable to discover an actual, important, controversial case in which ‘fit’ ever pre-
cluded the Dworkin of Right Answers from having his way.” Id.
65 For a sampling of the constitutional issues that are raised by such a prospect,
see McAffee, Substance Above All , supra  note 25, at 510-13; Richard A. Posner,
Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up:  The Question of
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights , in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE 433, 445-46 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); and R. George Wright, Is
Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation? , 4 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 463 (1995).
66 Creative judicial review on behalf of judicially discovered and imposed rights
has been described as the equivalent of “flight without instruments.”  Van Alstyne,
supra  note 55, at 212 (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW
73 (1981)).
67 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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now-infamous decision, the Court “effectively banished from the
Constitution” the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.68  But it did so on the basis of a
reading of the text that was not implausible on its face and, which
Charles Fairman, a leading historian, found was supported by
Thomas Cooley, an individual whose textualism was character-
ized as the “product of an eminently respectable mind, free from
any captivation of fancy.”69
In an article published over a decade ago, I cited works by
leading constitutional law scholars of the past fifty years rejecting
the Court’s narrow Slaughter-House  interpretation and deter-
mined that “the conclusion reached by all these scholars is unas-
sailable when the provision is read in historical context, even
though the text is ambiguous.”70  That article also reviewed the
powerful evidence that supports the proposition that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause “was probably the clause from which
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected most.”71
The problem, of course, was that the correct understanding of the
provision raised significant questions about federalism and judi-
cial power, at least to the mind of Justice Miller, the author of the
opinion.  The net result was that a Supreme Court justice used
underlying concerns about the “potential mischief” that could re-
sult from the alternative reading to warrant a clear misconstruc-
tion of the text.72  Thus, one can conclude that “Justice Miller
acted illegitimately in construing the clause contrary to the over-
whelming evidence as to its intended meaning than I ever could
be that his decision as to federalism and judicial power concerns
was illegitimate as lacking judicial statesmanship.”73
68 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause , 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1414 (1992). Compare  Amar, supra note 46, at 123 n.327 (concluding that
Court “basically read the [Privileges or Immunities Clause]—the central clause of
Section 1!—out of the Amendment” and that “no serious modern scholar—left,
right, or center—thinks this a plausible reading of the Amendment”), and EDWARD
S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1934) (stating that “the
Court virtually erased the ‘privileges and immunities’ clause from the amendment in
deference to the federal principle”).
69 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1370 (1971).
70 Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation—The Uses and Limitations
of Original Intent , 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 283 (1986) [hereinafter McAffee,
Constitutional Interpretation].
71 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22 (1980).
72 See  McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation , supra  note 70, at 286.
73 Id.  at 287.
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE402.txt unknown Seq: 17  3-JUL-02 10:28
The Constitution as Based on the Consent of the Governed 1261
There is a general lesson here for those who wish to learn it.
Under an unwritten constitution, there is nothing to stop judges
from imposing their own conceptions of justice and rights, includ-
ing excessively narrow ones—even if their constructions are un-
acceptable to most Americans and the fundamental rights
recognized have never been deemed fundamental by them.  Pro-
fessor Michael McConnell writes:
If rights are wrongly conceived, they can be as inimical to jus-
tice, and even to liberty, as any recognition of state power.
Enforcement of the unenumerated right to own slaves pre-
cludes emancipation.  Enforcement of the unenumerated right
of freedom of contract precludes minimum wage laws.  En-
forcement of the unenumerated right to abort overrides the
right to life.  Enforcement of the right to voluntary associa-
tions to control their own membership makes it more difficult
for the community to eradicate race and sex discrimination.
Enforcement of children’s rights against parental control con-
flicts with parents’ right to control the family.  The point is not
that any or all of these rights are wrongful, but that the recog-
nition of unenumerated rights is likely to conflict with plausi-
ble assertions of right on the other side.74
This is why a “justice-seeking reading of the document does
not warrant an interpreter to invent his own theory of justice and
call it ‘the Constitution,’” but calls for searching for “the Ameri-
can People’s particular sense of justice as embodied in the un-
folding words, deeds, and spirit of the Constitution and its
Amendments.”75  The reason we have a constitutional text, after
all, is to give us the opportunity to decide, and to implement our
74 Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy ,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 103-04 (1988).  This is why the “federal judiciary’s com-
plicity in the turn-of-the-century’s system of racial oppression should serve as a
warning of the political possibilities once an unwavering focus on the Constitution’s
terms and purposes is lost.” WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 174; accord  Amar,
supra  note 46, at 38 (concluding that the “judges generally underenforced the docu-
ment-supported rights of blacks and women while overenforcing various nondocu-
mentarian claims of rich and powerful interests”).  For a similar warning about the
potential effect of a Court that feels unleashed from the bounds of the text, see
Forrest McDonald, The Bill of Rights:  Unnecessary and Pernicious , in  THE BILL OF
RIGHTS:  GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 387 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds.,
1997).
75 Amar, supra  note 46, at 54.  This is why it is an extremely orthodox view to
suggest that the Constitution “may have its own theory of justice,” and to suggest
further that it is that theory “that is to govern” rather than a system of ideal justice
that might be apprehended by the Constitution’s interpreter.  William Van Alstyne,
Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:  Part II, Antinomial Choices and the Role of the
Supreme Court , 72 IOWA L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1987).
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decision, as to the moral claims that are sufficiently fundamental
to warrant demanding special justification for any intrusion.  A
decision to be governed by an unwritten constitution is thus a
decision to give up on the rule of law as a constitutional ideal:
What is ultimately at stake is the rule of law, understood in the
down-to-earth conception of John Adams and other foun-
ders—the ideal of being governed, to the extent practicable,
by preestablished rules rather than by occasional, and possibly
arbitrary, human edicts.  Some may be drawn to natural law
constitutionalism by the hope of grounding our fundamental
law in objective moral truth, but the discretion they would
grant could easily point us away from morality and law.76
C. The Views of Advocates of the “Textualist”
Unwritten Constitution
Ironically enough, however, despite the charge that unwritten
constitutionalism, or its equivalent, discounts the importance of
constitutional text, it is fair to say that constitutional text plays a
central role in justifying an expansive judicial role.  As Professor
Schauer has observed:
Dworkin grounds his argument for a moral reading of the
Constitution in the premise that such a reading is mandated by
specific features of this  constitutional text, its “broad and ab-
stract language” in particular.  That Dworkin’s argument is
substantially a textual one is apparent not only from his fre-
quent references to textual features such as “exceedingly ab-
stract moral language” and a textually patent “general
principle,” but also from the example he features, one that dis-
tinguishes between the Equal Protection Clause, which Dwor-
kin argues invokes moral argument, and the Third
Amendment, which for Dworkin does not.77
Thus the Equal Protection Clause, according to Dworkin, uses
76 MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 534.
77 Schauer, supra  note 2, at 1299.  Dworkin thus concludes that “[c]onstitutional
politics has been confused and corrupted by a pretense that judges (if only they were
not so hungry for power) could use politically neutral strategies of constitutional
interpretation.” FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5, at 37. Thus, judges “try to hide the
inevitable influence of their own convictions even from themselves, and the result is
a costly mendacity.” Id.  Accordingly, Professor McConnell observes that Dworkin
“claims that historical approaches to interpretation are ‘substitutes for fidelity,’
which ‘ignor[e] the text of the Constitution.’”  McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1269-70;
see also SMITH, supra  note 13, at 78 (finding that “Dworkin’s attention flows almost
entirely to those provisions which, precisely because they lack definite legal content,
can only be understood, he thinks, as expressing ‘broad and abstract principles of
political morality’—principles whose ‘scope is breathtaking’”) (quoting FREEDOM’S
LAW, supra  note 5, at 78, 73).
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a text that puts “its interpreters into the equality business” and,
given its nature, “the text unavoidably puts these implications
into the morality business as well.”78  Moreover, while he is clear
that “[t]he American Constitution includes a great many clauses
that are neither particularly abstract nor drafted in the language
of moral principle,”79 Dworkin is equally clear that he “is relying
substantially on the language of the text to demarcate the clauses
that generate a moral reading and those that do not.”80
Most students of the history, however, find it extremely doubt-
ful that the constitutional founders set out to grant such power to
constitutional interpreters.  Dworkin’s textual theory uses mod-
ern theories of law and language “that were quite foreign, indeed
probably would have been incomprehensible, to the framers of
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.”81  Moreover,
the framers’ “well-documented suspicion of judicial activism and
discretion makes it quite unlikely that they would have sanc-
tioned the sort of freewheeling judicial interpretation Dworkin’s
view implies.”82  And when the text of the Constitution is read to
insist that we take it as a open-ended moral document, it makes
“demands—multiple, repetitive, shifting, and sometimes incon-
sistent.”83  It has been observed that despite “the mechanical
tone of formulaic opinions, the palpable range of choice inherent
in the formulae communicates, not objectivity, but power with-
out responsibility.”84  It is hardly surprising, then, that Lawrence
Tribe, no advocate of judicial restraint, has argued the “text of
78 Schauer, supra  note 2, at 1299-1300.  Thus for Dworkin, “constitutional rights
are those rights that a philosopher-god would announce if called on to make the
Constitution the morally, legally, and politically best constitution it could be.”  Jed
Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation , in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 30, at 194, 219.
79 FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5, at 8.
80 Schauer, supra  note 2, at 1301.  Thus, according to Schauer, “[f]or Dworkin it
appears that the presence of the abstract language of moral principle within the text
is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for a moral reading of any clause con-
taining such language.” Id. ; see also SMITH, supra  note 13, at 84; Robin West, Integ-
rity and Universality:  A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1997).
81 MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 31 (1988).
82 GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 74-75 (1992).
83 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 122.
84 ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 147 (1989); see also  Farber,
supra  note 40, at 1093 (concluding that, after reviewing indeterminacies that plague
most interpretive methodologies, “[t]he original understanding of the ‘higher law’
may be even more elusive than that of more specific constitutional language”).
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the Constitution can be read to justify just about any decision
and so can safely be ignored.”85
In fact, it is often contended that those who ratify a constitu-
tion, and the legislatures that enact most laws, “possess only a
very limited sort of supremacy, inasmuch as they speak to us only
through the legislative instrument and their task is completed
when the statute is enacted.”86  Many have thus assumed that
“textualism amounts to noninterpretivism” because “general and
vague language effectively grants an open-ended discretion that
permits modern interpreters to adapt the Constitution to the
evolving needs of society.”87  But it is important to remember
that “the reason we give effect to constitutional or statutory lan-
guage is because of the authority we give to the intentional act
that gave that language the force of law.”88
If we do, we will also realize that
[t]he language of the [Constitution] is to be read not as barren
85 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 123 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion , 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995)).
86 McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism , supra  note 14, at 625.  Indeed, I have
noted  “[w]hat is frequently posited is an absolute conflict between ‘textualist’ and
‘intentionalist’ approaches to interpreting the Constitution; whereas textualism hon-
ors the instrument through which the legislature or constitutional adopters must
speak, intentionalism seeks to honor the will of those empowered to establish law.”
Id.  at 625-26.  The application of a principle that places all its focus on the writing as
“to both statutes and constitutions has been labeled ‘textualism’ in the United
States.”  Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy , 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 40 (2000).
But when the text is used as justification for a highly moral reading of the Constitu-
tion, it raises the question, why doesn’t the Constitution just say, “‘Do Justice?’”
Larry Alexander, Introduction  to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 30, at
1, 10.  And why is anything less than a text that provides such a strong stand even
binding?  It is thus common for advocates of a strongly moral reading to contend
that we are to be guided by the text, but “‘only broadly,’” and to still wind up stating
the justification “that would be made by a historicist, not by one who endorses jus-
tice-seeking constitutionalism.” Id.  Such advocates provide us with the Constitu-
tion’s history, but leave us wondering why.
87 McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism , supra  note 14, at 627.  Despite the
frequency with which such claims are made, a contrasting vision is as often stated.
E.g. , Paul F. Campos, A Text Is Just a Text , 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 330
(1996) (suggesting that “despite the obscurantist theology of modern judicial review,
the Constitution’s text is not full of nebulous generalities calling out for interpretive
solidification at the hands of berobed jurisprudential philosophers and their aca-
demic hangers-on”).
88 McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism , supra  note 14, at 629.  Furthermore,
“[w]e all know that the role of legislatures, as well as constitutional adopters, is not
simply to ‘pass statutes’ or to ‘adopt constitutions,’ but to establish principle and
policy, and that we honor their words because we recognize their authority to do
so.” Id.
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words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experi-
ence illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed
them.  Not what words did Madison and Hamilton use, but
what was it in their minds which they conveyed?89
Even though we are focused on the words employed in the text,
we read them in context, which “comprises those elements
shared by the speaker and her intended audience on which the
speaker can rely to help make her meaning clear.”90  We recog-
nize that most constitutional provisions, like most statutory pro-
visions, are designed “to change the law to correct some problem
the prior law didn’t adequately address.”91  The most fundamen-
tal questions for determining constitutional meaning, then, be-
come those set forth in Heydon’s Case ,92 which included “what
was considered to be the defect in the prior law,” and how the
constitutional provision “goes about remedying that defect.”93
But if we acknowledge that the power of the text comes from its
having been authoritatively adopted, “it follows that the princi-
ples never adopted by the people cannot be authoritative, even if
they have some linguistic plausibility.”94  A related conclusion is
that “to apply an unintended meaning is no different from intro-
ducing a principle that has no textual basis whatsoever.”95
So the central question that must be raised to advocates of un-
written constitutionalism on interpretive grounds is whether the
text will give us the critical guidance we need to determine when
the Constitution is giving an essentially open-ended moral direc-
tive.  Several specific examples will be helpful.  Perhaps the most
obvious example of a seemingly open-ended, vague constitu-
tional guarantee is the Ninth Amendment.  By its terms, the
Amendment prohibits a construction that would “deny or dispar-
89 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
90 Patrick J. Kelley, Objective Interpretation and Objective Meaning in Holmes and
Dickerson:  Interpretive Practice and Interpretive Theory , 1 NEV. L.J. 112, 133 (2001).
91 Id.  at 135.
92 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
93 Kelley, supra  note 90, at 136.
94 Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law , 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1528 (1989); see also  Kay, supra  note 30,
at 31.
95 McConnell, supra  note 94, at 1528.  Professor McConnell thus suggests that
“[t]he only difference between the unintended meaning and the extratextual princi-
ple is verbal happenstance.” Id.  This is why there is an obvious connection between
the modern emphasis on textualism and revisionism; if one is not inclined to honor
the decisions made at an earlier time, focusing on the “invitation” of the language
becomes a natural strategy. See  Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind , 88 MICH. L.
REV. 104 (1989).
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age” other rights “retained by the people,” in addition to those
already enumerated in the Constitution.96  If the Amendment is
taken as referring to so-called “unenumerated” rights, somehow
similar to those already specified elsewhere in the text, it is diffi-
cult to imagine a provision that would more directly call on con-
stitutional interpreters to engage in freestanding constitutional
analogizing to existing textual provisions—a formula for estab-
lishing unenumerated rights as fundamental constitutional
rights.97  The largest number of advocates of  the “unenumerated
rights” construction, of course, have taken the Amendment to be
an invitation to interpreters to enforce the rights perceived to be
part of “moral reality” that grants to humans inalienable natural
rights.98
But if this standard modern reading of the Ninth Amendment
makes a certain sense out of the text, it is clear that it rests just as
decisively on the exploitation of a basic ambiguity.  The text of
the Ninth Amendment refers to other rights “retained by the
people.”99  While this language could refer to implied limitations
on the powers granted the proposed federal government, in addi-
tion to the express limits specified in the Bill of Rights, it is also
true that the “other rights ‘retained by the people’” could simply
allude to the many rights and interests over which the people did
not convey power to control when they granted limited, specifi-
cally enumerated powers to the new federal government in Arti-
96 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
97 This sort of view leads rather naturally to seeing the Constitution as “a sus-
tained project to define and maintain the proper relationship between government
and its citizens.” Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the
Fourth, and Plead the Fifth.  But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amend-
ment? , 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 263 (1988) [hereinafter Sager, Ninth Amend-
ment].  Professor Sager perceives a big difference between his “pragmatic-justice”
account of the Constitution and its ordinary perception, focused on the power of
self-government residing in the people, which Sager says describes the Constitution
as “merely a rather unusual statute.”  Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:
Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 415
(1993).  A question worth pondering, however, is whether courts can legitimately
construe a statement of general principle favoring human rights as a limitation on
government power that supplies “determinate and dichotomous answers to ques-
tions of legal authority.” WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 6; see also  McAffee, Le-
gal Enforceability , supra  note 25, at 792-94.
98 For a sampling of those sources holding such a view, see supra  note 3.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see generally  McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra
note 23.
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cle I of the Constitution.100  In justifying the decision not to
include a bill of rights, Madison explained that “the Constitution
is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the
people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if
the residuum was thrown into the hands of the Government.”101
As reflected in Madison’s statement, defenders of the Consti-
tution were afraid that inclusion of a bill of rights would undercut
the enumerated powers scheme as a device for securing individ-
ual rights and lead to the inference that “the residuum was
thrown into the hands of the government.”102  The Federal Con-
stitution was contrasted with the constitutions of the states be-
cause, under them, the people had “invested their
representatives with every right and authority which they did not
in explicit terms reserve.”103
Under the proposed Federal Constitution, by comparison, the
people had “retained” as rights all that they had not granted as
powers to the federal government.  The implied rights reading of
the Ninth Amendment requires us to presume something con-
trary to the assumption of its advocates—that there were inher-
ent rights in the federal system, but not in the constitutional
systems of the states.  But those defending the Constitution did
not assume that there were any inherent rights in the federal sys-
tem because they did not need to; the people’s rights stemmed
from the obvious implications of a limited grant of federal pow-
ers.104  The existence of an extremely plausible alternative read-
100 Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment , 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 61, 68 (1996) [hereinafter McAffee, Critical Guide].
101 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in BENNETT B.
PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 114 (1955).
102 Id., reprinted in PATTERSON, supra  note 101, at 114.  Madison raised the par-
ticular fear that an inference of a bill of rights might well be that all rights omitted
from the bill “were intended to be assigned into the hands of the [g]eneral
[g]overnment.” Id.  at 439, reprinted in PATTERSON, supra  note 101, at 115.  Clearly,
however, Madison did not believe that this would be the inference drawn from the
enumerated powers scheme without the addition of a bill of rights.
103 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in  2 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 167 (Merrill Jen-
sen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].  By contrast, under the
proposed Federal Constitution, because of the enumerated powers scheme, “the re-
verse of the proposition [found in the state constitutions] prevails, and everything
which is not given, is reserved.” Id.  at 167-68.
104 See  4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 149 (2d ed. 1996) [herein-
after ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July
28, 1788) (arguing that under a “general legislature, with undefined powers,” such as
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ing of the text itself suggests that the answer as to the nature of
the provision in question will be derived from the history rather
than from the text.105  At the very least, the text itself will not
provide us with the answer to the question we seek to resolve.106
If the noted textual ambiguity is resolved by looking to natural
rights to infer the rights impliedly “retained” by the people, as
advocated by modern proponents of unenumerated rights, it
would also make sense to apply the provision so as to limit state
power, given that we are presuming that this was a decision to
“vest these rights in the people, rather than in any govern-
ment.”107  But if the Ninth Amendment is read as limiting state
those that existed in the states, “a bill of rights would not only have been proper, but
necessary” because it would have “operated as an exception to the legislative au-
thority in such particulars”; by contrast, the implication of adequate rights reserved
to the people under the Constitution is because the proposed federal government
will have “powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined”).  The alternative
reading of the Ninth Amendment’s text would link the reference to rights “retained
by the people” with the natural rights assumptions of social contract political theory.
For a useful analysis of the issues raised, see McAffee, Social Contract Theory , supra
note 23, at 296-305.
105 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
123-24 (1998) (concluding that “the amendment’s legislative history strongly sup-
ports an enumerated-powers, federalism-based reading” and that its purpose was to
prevent an inference “from the mere enumeration of a right in the Bill of Rights that
implicit federal power in fact exists in a given domain”); McAffee, Critical Guide ,
supra  note 100, at 64 n.16 (citing sources that reject the unenumerated rights reading
of the Ninth Amendment).  This much is at least acknowledged implicitly in the
many works that have sought to contend that the historical context supports the
unenumerated rights reading. See  sources cited supra  note 3. Compare MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS 65 (1994), with MCAFFEE, supra note
25, at 171. See also  Schauer, supra  note 2, at 1303 n.32 (noting that “[w]hile in
substantial conflict with the text, the non-moral reading of the Ninth Amendment
may have some historical support”); BASSHAM, supra  note 82, at 184 n.21 (describ-
ing my work as providing a “powerful critique” of the more “liberal” reading); Van
Alstyne, supra  note 55, at 212 (describing reliance on the Ninth Amendment as basis
for recognizing new rights “without a shred of historical evidence or other support”).
106 This is precisely why those who have adopted a more restricted reading of the
Ninth Amendment have not showed any lack of respect for constitutional text.  I, for
one, was powerfully influenced in support of the unenumerated rights reading by
ELY, supra  note 71, at 34-41; it was a careful review of the text, in light of the con-
text in which it was uttered, that persuaded me that an alternative reading of the text
was more plausible.
107 Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights:  The Ninth Amend-
ment , in  1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra  note 3, at 291, 335.  This
conclusion would be powerfully reinforced as well if the reference to other rights
retained by the people referenced the rights the people “retained” under the inalien-
able rights doctrine of social contract theory.  A substantial group of scholars have
read the Ninth Amendment as applying by its terms to limiting the powers of the
states. See , e.g. , Charles L. Black Jr., “One Nation Indivisible”:  Unnamed Human
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governments,108 the already existing wedge between this view of
the Constitution and the views held by Thomas Jefferson—need-
less to say, an important figure, particularly in the coming forth
of the Bill of Rights109—become an unbridgeable gap.
In 1819 and 1820, the nation experienced the crisis of the Mis-
souri Compromise.  In the midst of this crisis, it was clear to Jef-
ferson that the threatened rejection of Missouri’s bid for
statehood unless it abandoned its slave system or opened its bor-
ders to free blacks represented a violation of the original federal
bargain and threatened to undermine Missouri’s sovereign power
to determine its own domestic affairs.110  Jefferson may well have
been a natural rights thinker, but there is little doubt that he was
also a “states’ rights” thinker who in 1787, as well as 1820, would
have put states’ rights ahead of natural rights in the context of
resolving any clash of values.111  We have every reason to believe
that the framers of the Constitution would not have purposely
Rights in the States , 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 17, 29 (1991); Bennett B. Patterson, The
Forgotten Ninth Amendment , in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra
note 3, at 107, 114-20; Norman G. Redlich, Are There “Certain Rights . . . Retained
by the People?”, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 806 (1962).
108 The limits on government found in the Federal Bill of Rights were not viewed
historically as having any application to state governments. See , e.g. , Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Douglas W. Kmiec & Stephen B.
Presser, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:  HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOS-
OPHY 725 (1998) (finding “little doubt” that “the Court is correct on this point, as a
glance at any of the better histories of the period will confirm”).
109 See , e.g. , McAffee, Legal Enforceability , supra  note 25, at 769-71 (describing
impact of Jefferson’s views on the “legal check” a Bill of Rights might bring in influ-
encing Madison’s drafting of the amendments).
110 PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:  MAKING THE DECLARATION OF IN-
DEPENDENCE 185 (1997).
111 Interestingly, although modern scholars have ridiculed what they took as a
“federalism” reading of the Ninth Amendment, given that the text itself refers to
“rights,” in August of 1789, while the nation considered whether it ought to adopt
the Bill of Rights, William L. Smith endorsed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments on
the grounds that “they will go a great way in preventing Congress from interfering
with our negroes after 20 years or prohibiting the importation of them.”  Letter from
William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 10, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CON-
GRESS 273, 273 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY RE-
CORD].  The feared danger was that Congress may “by a strained construction of
some power embarrass us very much.” Id., reprinted in DOCUMENTARY RECORD,
supra , at 273.  The practice of running together the purposes of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments was standard and usual. See DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra,  at 267
(describing proposal of Roger Sherman that ran together what became the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments); 2 SCHWARTZ, supra  note 53, at 911-12 (setting forth pro-
posal of New York ratifying convention that combined Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments into a single provision).
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left the door open to a finding of unenumerated rights that un-
dercut the sovereignty of the states.112
Even apart from the history indicating that a federalism-based
reading was almost certainly intended by those who drafted and
ratified the Ninth Amendment, it seems highly probable that the
Amendment would have been viewed as at most stating an
agreed-upon principle, but not as stating enforceable limits on
governmental power.  A recent, important work on the theory of
constitutional interpretation offered these observations:
In order for the text to serve as law, it must be rulelike.  In
order to be a governing rule, it must possess a certain specific-
ity in order to connect it to a given situation.  Further, it must
indicate a decision with a fair degree of certainty.  Such cer-
tainty and specificity need not be absolute, but the law does
need to provide determinate and dichotomous answers to
questions of legal authority.  In order for the Constitution to
be legally binding, judges must be able to determine that a
given action either is or is not allowed by its terms.  Similarly,
the Constitution is binding only to the extent that judges do
not have discretion in its application.  Although the applica-
tion of the law may require controversial judgments, the law
nonetheless imposes obligations on the judge that are re-
flected in the vindication of the legal entitlements of one party
or another.  For the Constitution to serve this purpose, it must
be elaborated as a series of doctrines, formulas, or tests.  Thus,
constitutional interpretation necessarily is the unfolding of
constitutional law.  Debates over constitutional meaning be-
come debates over the proper formulation of relatively narrow
rules.113
The framers may have believed in natural rights, but the secur-
ity offered by their Bill of Rights was limited to “those that expe-
rience had shown were suitable for constitutional protection, and
they were secured by inclusion in a legally enforceable bill of
rights.”114  By and large, those who framed the American Consti-
tution avoided adopting anything “so general that it can scarcely
form the basis of any action to challenge governmental restric-
tions upon liberty.”115  Unlike those who have fought revolutions
112 See generally  Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate
the Declaration of Independence? , 1 NEV. L.J. 138 (2001).
113 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 6.
114 Bernard Schwartz, Experience Versus Reason:  “Beautiful Books and Great
Revolutions” , in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 421, 422 (Ron-
ald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1997).
115 Id.  at 423.  The American framers thus avoided the adoption of a principle
that “may serve as the foundation for a system of political philosophy, but it can
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to vindicate broad ideals that all too often have not been trans-
lated into meaningful accomplishments, the American revolut-
ionaries avoided centering their issues on principles “too general
to be made the basis of judicial decision in specific cases.”116
If we move beyond the historical question of the intended
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, and the Court’s reliance on
the Ninth Amendment to bolster its modern holdings on the
right of privacy, there is strong support for the view that in 1997
“the Roe  era came to an end.”117  In Washington v. Gluck-
sberg ,118 the Court appeared to squarely reject the “moral philo-
sophic” approach to discovering and defining unenumerated
fundamental constitutional rights.119  This is an especially note-
worthy development inasmuch as the only plausible historical
claims that the Ninth Amendment was intended to secure
unenumerated fundamental rights are ones that link it to the nat-
ural rights thinking that characterized the social contract theory
that was predominant at the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion.120  Concluding that such rights must be either textually
based or be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,’”121 the Court was clear that its task was to deter-
mine what the people deemed fundamental, and not what the
Justices are persuaded should be  fundamental.
scarcely be the basis by itself for legal protection of specific personal rights and
liberties.” Id.  at 424.
116 Id.  at 424.
117 Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition ,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 666.  Indeed, other commentators had previously noted
that, well prior to the Court’s decision in Glucksberg , the Ninth Amendment “had
vanished.” ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE:  THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION 323 (1991).
118 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
119 McConnell, supra  note 117, at 669.  The Court itself emphasized that
[t]he right assumed in Cruzan , however, was not simply deduced from ab-
stract concepts of personal autonomy.  Given the common-law rule that
forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.  The de-
cision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as per-
sonal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,
but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.
Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 725.
120 For those supporting this reading of the history, see the sources cited supra
note 3.  For one critical response to this view, see McAffee, Social Contract Theory ,
supra  note 23, at 296-305.
121 Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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The Court thus clarified that the right of privacy is not an
open-ended right to personal autonomy, and “it appears that, for
the moment at least, the Ninth Amendment has no role to
play.”122  “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not war-
rant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, inti-
mate, and personal decisions are so protected.”123  Professor
McConnell’s analysis is especially helpful:
The traditionalist approach adopted in Glucksberg differs
sharply from the moral philosophic approach not just in its
substance but in its intellectual style.  The moral philosophic
approach is deductive and theoretical, deriving specific pre-
scriptions from more general theoretical propositions.  For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit’s argument for recognizing a right to
assisted suicide was based on the assertion that this right is
encompassed within a supposed right of each individual “to
make the ‘most intimate and personal choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy.’”  The traditionalist approach, by
contrast, is inductive and experiential.  Rather than reasoning
down from abstract principles, it reasons up from concrete
cases and circumstances.  It can be seen as the conservative
heir to legal realism:  cautious, empirical, flexible, skeptical of
claims of overarching theory.124
A second example illustrates the limits of text as a guide to
determining constitutional provisions requiring essentially unlim-
ited moral analysis.  Professor Michael Moore relies on the Due
Process Clause as an example of a text supplying a term that is
vague because it calls for interpreters to decide the scope of “lib-
erty.”125  And the difference “between ‘liberty,’ in the fourteenth
amendment, and ‘freedom of speech’ or ‘free exercise’ of religion
in the first amendment, is surely a matter of degree.”126  But
John Hart Ely has found “that the text is manifestly opposed to
the substantive reading of the clause that undergirds the right of
privacy.”127  While it is true that Professor Tribe, to use a promi-
122 ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra  note 117, at 323.  As the “Court has moved
away from any kind of consensus on the right of privacy,” it quite clearly has moved
“even farther away from any resolution about the meaning of the Ninth Amend-
ment.” Id.
123 Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 727.
124 McConnell, supra  note 117, at 672.
125 See , e.g. , Moore, supra  note 1, at 123, 127-31; supra  note 6; supra  note 14 and
accompanying text.
126 Moore, supra  note 1, at 123.
127 McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation , supra  note 70, at 291 (citing ELY,
supra  note 71, at 18-19).  By its terms, the clause prohibits the deprivation of the
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nent example, has argued that “the textual point of departure for
the doctrine is the explication of the concept of ‘law’ that is re-
quired prior to substantive deprivations,”128 it is reasonably clear
that Tribe’s argument “establishe[d] at most an apparent ambigu-
ity that is more plausibly resolved in favor of Ely’s construction,”
and in my view “the historical evidence supports the thesis that
substantive due process was a judicial invention that informally
amended the meaning of the text.”129  Whatever the merits of the
historical evidence, it is fairly clear that the text of the Due Pro-
cess Clause itself does not tell us whether we are invited or re-
quired to bring a moral analysis to bear in giving effect to the
provision in question.130
The final example is presented by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Professor Dworkin recommends
interests in question only where there is a lack of adequate (“due”) process; history
suggests that it is appropriately referred to as the “due process” clause rather than as
the “life, liberty or property” clause.
128 McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation, supra  note 70, at 291 (citing Laurence
H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories , 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1066 n.9 (1980)).
129 Id.  at 291-92.  This conclusion is lent strong support by an article that con-
fronts the text of the Due Process Clause in the context of the balance of the Consti-
tution’s text as well as the best historical evidence. See  John Harrison, Substantive
Due Process and the Constitutional Text , 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 525-34 (1997);
BASSHAM, supra  note 82, at 73-74.  Indeed, Professor Harrison documents that there
is a historical connection between the concepts of substantive due process and the
historical claim that there was intended to be an unwritten Constitution. See Harri-
son, supra , at 548-50.  But even if we could justify a doctrine of substantive due
process as a construction of the text of the Due Process Clause, under a “structural
vested rights reading,” id.  at 553, another step is required to warrant the creation of
an implied fundamental rights doctrine inasmuch as there would still need to be an
explanation of how it is that such rights have the ability to “trump other public
interests that fundamental rights are deemed to have.”  McAffee, Constitutional In-
terpretation, supra  note 70, at 293.  The present author has not seen an attempt to
justify this next step in the analysis, and text and history would seem to preclude it.
See  Harrison, supra , at 553 (concluding that “[i]f substantive content means the
reading adopted in . . . Roe ,” it is fair to say “that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment could not possibly have had what would today be called substan-
tive content”).
130 Even a modern advocate of unenumerated rights has concluded that “the very
phrase ‘substantive due process ’ teeters on self-contradiction,” and hence “provides
neither a sound starting point nor a directional push to proper legal analysis.”
Amar, supra  note 46, at 123; see also id.  at 122-23 (describing recent unenumerated
rights case as “invoking the nonmammalian whale of substantive due process, a
phantasmogorical beast conjured up by judges without clear textual warrant”);
CHARLES BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 3 (1997) (describing substantive
due process as “paradoxical, even oxymoronic”).  Professor Black is also not known
as an opponent of unenumerated rights.
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consideration of “different elaborations of the phrase ‘equal pro-
tection of the laws,’ each of which we can recognize as a principle
of political morality that might have won [the framers’] respect,”
and then an evaluation of “which of these it makes most sense to
attribute to them, given everything else we know.”131  As Profes-
sor McConnell wrote, “So far, so good.”132  But in short order,
Professor Dworkin confronts the possibility that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause stated “only the relatively weak political principle
that laws must be enforced in accordance with their terms, so
that legal benefits conferred on everyone, including blacks, must
not be denied, in practice, to anyone.”133  Finding that this read-
ing is implausible as a matter of history, he concludes that the
framers “declared a principle of quite breathtaking scope and
power:  the principle that government must treat everyone as of
equal status and with equal concern.”134
But Professor McConnell accurately observes that “[t]his is a
textbook example of what logicians call the fallacy of black-and-
white reasoning” inasmuch as it falsely posits “that there are only
two alternatives,” and then purports “to prove one by disproving
the other.”135  In his review article, McConnell offers several
middle-ground principles that can be reconciled with the breadth
of language employed in the Equal Protection Clause without
going all the way to Dworkin’s “equal concern” principle.136  Ac-
131 FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5, at 9.
132 McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1281.
133 FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5, at 9.  There is in fact little room for doubt that
the core meaning of the guarantee of equal “protection” of the laws was to assure
the same enforcement (or “protection”) of laws for members of the Black race as
that enjoyed by those who had not been slaves. See  McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s
Originalism , supra  note 14, at 648 n.112; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court:  Limitations on State Power 1865-1873 , 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 353-
54 (1984).  This was a right that was assured to all members of society under social
contract theory as a compensation for foregoing the right to self-help in enforcing
(and judging) one’s own rights.  It was also a right that had been denied to Blacks
not only by slave laws, but also by the laws (and practices) adopted in the South
after the Civil War.
134 FREEDOM’S LAW, supra  note 5, at 10; accord BARBER, supra  note 5, at 68
(suggesting that Dworkin argues “for moral philosophy so effectively that all sides
should have accepted it as a commonplace by now”).
135 McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1282.
136 Id.  at 1282-84.  Professor McConnell suggests as possibilities a rule of “strict
formal equality,” id.  at 1282, without race being used at all; a rule of absolute equal-
ity as to a limited category of rights; a rule prohibiting “special legislation,” with all
its Jacksonian permutations; and a rule against “caste legislation” based upon an
“anti-subordination” theory. See generally  John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimi-
nation, and the Fourteenth Amendment , 13 CONST. COMMENT. 243 (1996).  However,
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cording to McConnell, “there are not two, but at least three alter-
native approaches” to making sense of the Equal Protection
Clause.  We can (1) follow the framers’ expectations, including
their thoughts about the “specific applications” of constitutional
language; (2) follow the “moral and political principles” they in-
tended to express; or (3) follow the text in a way that best imple-
ments our understanding of their abstract, moral language.137
Relying on the example of “interpreting” the political thought of
Aristotle in a scholarly paper, McConnell argues that a modern
scholar would be better off following the second rather than the
third approach.138
McConnell’s analysis reflects why there is still a debate over an
“unwritten” constitution.  Whatever label is used, it seems rea-
sonably clear that those who would “interpret” the Constitution
as recommended by Professor Dworkin would be far more fo-
cused on deriving the best moral answers to difficult and vexing
moral questions than on understanding what those who drafted
the Constitution were trying to convey.  It may be that Professor
Dworkin or someone else can satisfy thoughtful Americans that
those who gave us the Fourteenth Amendment were empowering
judges and other authoritative interpreters to decide the implica-
tions of a commitment to the general, abstract value of political
Dworkin’s adoption of an open-ended moral reading to replace an admittedly lim-
ited reading begins with the assumption, Professor McConnell suggests, that there is
no logical basis for assuming constitutional provisions should be read at the highest
level of generality.”  McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1283; see also ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 47 (1997) (not-
ing advocacy of a doctrine of a living constitution, “a ‘morphing’ document that
means, from age to age, what it ought to mean”).
137 McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1284-85.  If we take the approach recommended
by Professor McConnell, it may be in part because many now recognize that the
argument that constitutions and statutes should be read “in their current context,
rather than original, frequently rests on the false assumption that the original con-
text refers only to specific contemplated results rather than the general meaning of
the text as understood in light of the relevant linguistic, social, and historical set-
ting.” See McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism , supra  note 14, at 647 n.110.
This is why a noted expert on statutory construction, Professor Reed Dickerson,
joined the criticism of a decision interpreting a statute enacted prior to women’s
suffrage that limited the right to serve on a jury to eligible voters as not permitting
women to serve on a jury even after being extended the right to vote.  Dickerson
argued that the court erred in thinking that the legislative “intent” to exclude wo-
men from jury service prevailed over the clearly expressed intent to equate the con-
ditions of jury service with the qualifications for voting. Id.  I wrote:  “A great deal
of criticism of originalism in constitutional interpretation rests on this same fallacy.”
Id .
138 See  McConnell, supra  note 64, at 1285.
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equality that would now be embodied in the Constitution; but
most Americans would require more than a bare text to warrant
them in reaching this conclusion.
II
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
In his speeches during the ratification debates, James Wilson
stressed that “the nature and kind of that government, which
has been proposed for the United States, by the late conven-
tion [is] in its principle purely democratical.”139
According to the Declaration [of Independence], the self-evident
truth that all men are created equal in their inalienable rights
poses an end and standards for government (“to secure these
rights”); it shows the necessity of government (“governments are
instituted among men”); and it identifies the source of govern-
ment’s authority (“deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed”).  These self-evident principles set the bounds of
the debate on what form of government should be adopted.  That
the best form of government is not also self-evident reflects the
fact that these principles offer somewhat contradictory political
guidance.140
A. The Founders’ Views as Embodied in Constitutional Text
The Constitution begins with the words “We the People,” and
the significance of its having been adopted by the people who
comprised the states, and not by the state governments who were
the parties to the Articles of Confederation, was not lost on the
people who debated the merits of the Constitution in deciding
whether to ratify.141  Justice Marshall probably speaks well for
139 Thomas L. Pangle, The Philosophic Understandings of Human Nature Inform-
ing the Constitution , in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION:  THE CHALLENGE TO
LOCKE, MONTESQUIEU, JEFFERSON, AND THE FEDERALISTS FROM UTILITARIANISM,
MARXISM, FREUDIANISM, PRAGMATISM, EXISTENTIALISM 9, 37 (Allan Bloom ed.,
1990) [hereinafter CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION].
140 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Constitution, in CONFRONTING
THE CONSTITUTION, supra  note 139, at 77, 78.
141 It was, for example, a standard objection to the Constitution that it spoke for
“the people” rather than the states. See , e.g. , McAffee, Legal Enforceability , supra
note 25, at 759 n.43.  Patrick Henry, one of the Constitution’s staunch opponents, for
example, objected that the Constitution referred to the people “instead of, We, the
States ,” from which he drew the inference that this is “one great consolidated Na-
tional Government of the people of all the States.” See SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
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the majority of the framers when he asserts that “[t]he govern-
ment proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and estab-
lished,’ in the name of the people,” and they “were at perfect
liberty to accept or reject it.”142  We hear of the “higher law”
background of the American Constitution, but we sometimes pay
too little attention to the manner by which this “background”
entered for foreground, which was by being given roots in a doc-
ument that proceeded from the people—who were assumed by
the founders to be the fountain of all political power.143  The
American Constitution has been described as “[a] WHOLE
PEOPLE exercising its first and greatest power—performing an
act of SOVEREIGNTY, ORIGINAL, and UNLIMITED.”144
The doctrine of popular sovereignty, moreover,  became cru-
cial to defending various decisions made in Philadelphia.145  It is
fair to say that as the Constitution’s proponents defended the de-
cision to create a new form of government, the Constitution’s
provision for popular ratification, and its creation of an extended
republic on the base of popular representation, they placed re-
newed emphasis on the plenary power of the people to change
their forms of government at will.146  Indeed, if the founding gen-
eration was committed to the idea of a written Constitution, they
gave at least equal weight to the power of the people to establish
constitutions.147
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 309 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 1965).
142 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103-04 (1819).
143 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 117 (Richard Loss ed., 1981).
144 WOOD, supra  note 29, at 535.
145 It has been accurately observed that “[d]riven by the necessity of the hostility
of the state legislatures and by theoretical and political concerns to ground the new
federal constitution in the authority of the people, the Philadelphia Convention both
represented and contributed to the implementation of popular sovereignty through
the mechanism of popular convention.” WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 124.
146 See , e.g. , 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra  note 103, at 383 (James Wilson,
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).  As Iredell argued in North Car-
olina, “[t]hose in power are [the people’s] servants and agents; and the people, with-
out their consent, may new-model their government whenever they think proper.”  4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra  note 104, at 9 (James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying
Convention, July 24, 1788).
147 It has been observed that, for the founding generation, “[t]he right to share
equally in this decision [on the form, organization and powers of the government
instituted to secure the rights of all] is the most important human right because
government is the means by which all other rights are secured.” Walter Berns, The
Constitution as Bill of Rights , in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?
50, 58 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985).
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James Wilson contended that popular sovereignty “is a power
paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and
indefinite in its extent.”148  He affirmed that “[i]n all govern-
ments, whatever is their form, however they may be constituted,
there must be a power established from which there is no appeal
and which is therefore called absolute, supreme, and uncontrolla-
ble.”149  But Wilson was restating what had been a standard view
among those who had implemented constitutions since 1776.150
Indeed, it is clear that this sovereign power was viewed as so fun-
damental because it was the basis of the colonies’ claimed au-
thority to declare their independence from England.151
The argument for judicial review was premised on the superior
authority of the people, as sovereign, to the authority of their
“agents” who, as government officials, were bound by the terms
of the written Constitution.  The premise of the argument is that
it is the duty of judges to interpret and implement the fundamen-
tal law adopted by the people.  If we start with the “noninterpre-
tive” premise that judges may properly limit government based
on principles of justice never articulated before, we have aban-
doned in effect the whole concept of separation of powers.  The
1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided that “the judicial shall
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them” so that “it may be a government of laws and not of
men.”152  If the practice of legal interpretation renders this provi-
148 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra  note 103, at 349 (James Wilson, Penn-
sylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787).
149 Id.  at 348 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787).
150 Leslie Goldstein observes that eight of the fourteen state constitutions
adopted between 1776 and 1780 included paraphrases of the idea of the people’s
right to “alter or abolish” their “form” of government. GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 25,
at 73-74.
151 See , e.g. , MAIER, supra  note 110, at 86-90.  A county in Maryland asserted that
“‘the People have the indubitable right to reform or abolish a Government which
may appear to them insufficient for the exigency of their affairs.’” Id.  at 87.  For
additional insight on the founders’ commitment to the idea of popular sovereignty,
see McAffee, Substance Above All , supra  note 25, at 519 n.56.
152 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX, reprinted in  3 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1888, 1893 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter
STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in  5 STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, supra , at 2787, 2787 (providing that “the legislative, executive, and su-
preme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from
each other”), VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in  7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra , at
3812, 3813 (providing that “the legislative and executive powers of the State should
be separate and distinct from the judiciary”), id. , reprinted in  7 STATE CONSTITU-
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sion literally invalid, in that legal construction sometimes re-
quires the interpreter to make choices with the effect of
“making,” rather than merely “interpreting,” law, one would
hope that such cases would at least be exceptional rather than
typical.  Recognition of an “unwritten” constitution, by contrast,
simply abandons the project of “interpreting” the written Consti-
tution to “discover” the requirements of an underlying moral
reality.
B. The Theory Underlying the Doctrine of Popular
Sovereignty:  Does It Make Sense in the Twenty-
First Century?
The American constitutional order is best understood as an ex-
periment in collective self-rule.153  “At root, a theory of popular
sovereignty is a version of a theory of democracy.”154  This is why
the Constitution “opens with a ringing pronouncement of its
democratic mandate.”155  It begins by telling us “why we should
sit up and take notice—why, indeed, the document deems itself
supreme.”156  Given the Constitution’s commitment to popular
self-government, it hardly matters whether “[w]hat We the Peo-
ple have said in the document makes more sense than what the
Justices have said in the doctrine.”157
But it is critical to be aware that a paradox is necessarily in-
volved.  It is tempting to think the Declaration of Independence’s
linkage of the legitimacy of government to the “consent of the
governed” implies commitment to majoritarian decision making
as to every issue about the role of government, or at least every
TIONS, supra , at 3812, 3815 (providing that the “legislative, executive, and judiciary
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers prop-
erly belonging to the other”), and GA. CONST. of 1777, art. I, reprinted in  2 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra , at 777, 778 (providing that the “legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the other”).
153 It has been persuasively argued that “[t]he first freedom of self-governing peo-
ple is not, therefore, the freedom of speech.  It is the freedom to write:  to give
oneself a text.  A fully self-governing people must be the author of its own constitu-
tion.”  Rubenfeld, supra  note 78, at 218.  On the theme of self-government, see
BELZ, supra  note 21, at 12.
154 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 127.
155 Amar, supra  note 46, at 34.
156 Id.  As Amar observes, precisely because the Constitution “comes from the
People . . . ordinary decisions by ordinary government officials, including judges,
occupy a lower level.” Id.
157 Id.  at 94.
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important issue.  But there is no question that one of the strate-
gies of our constitutional order has been to establish rules of law
that limit the authority of democratically elected, and supported,
bodies.158  At the very least, this demands that we have a closer
look at the idea that we should have government by consent.159
To be “governed” meaningfully, American constitutionalism as-
sumes, is to forego the collective right to immediately make deci-
sions according to one’s sense of the “merits” of competing
values that logically  would bear on the decision.160  The assump-
tion is that we “rule” ourselves more meaningfully and effec-
tively if we proceed by the adoption of rules that will be used to
make more immediate decisions.161
As Larry Alexander has observed, undoubtedly “much of the
resistance to original intent theories of constitutional law is really
resistance to all practical authority.”162  The moment we adopt a
rule that “binds” us all until it is authoritatively changed, we have
in some sense undercut the idea of being controlled only by the
“consent” of the governed, inasmuch as a majority may favor the
result that is contradicted by the rule.163  One cannot view such a
158 See  Rubenfeld, supra  note 78, at 195 (suggesting that “[b]y purporting to bind
the sovereign popular will tomorrow, the Constitution violates the very principle of
self-government on which it stakes its claim to legitimate authority in the first
place”).
159 For advocates of “contemporary” ratification, which means courts attempting
to discern what interests have been established as fundamental over time, “the
choice is between being ruled by the dead hand of the past or the living present.”
Murray Dry, Federalism and the Constitution:  The Founders’ Design and Contempo-
rary Constitutional Law , 4 CONST. COMMENT. 233, 234 (1987).
160 The whole idea that we might be governed by decisions made in the past
rather clearly creates an issue of constitutional legitimacy and cries out for “a con-
frontation with the constitutional problem of time.”  Rubenfeld, supra  note 78, at
209.  We thus need an account of how a two-hundred-year-old text “could possibly
exert legitimate authority over democratic majorities in the future.” Id.  at 211.
161 As Rubenfeld acknowledges, “[i]f the Constitution’s purchase on legitimacy
depends on its conformity with present majority will, the price of attaining this legiti-
macy would be constitutionalism itself.” Id.  at 197.  “Written constitutionalism,”
America claims, “denies the desirability (and perhaps the possibility) of self-govern-
ment at any given time .  It rather embraces the struggle for self-government over
time .” Id.  at 214.  In the minds of its framers, though, there is no question that the
Constitution’s greatest achievement for mankind was its resolution of “‘the problem
of his capacity for self-government.’” CORWIN, supra  note 68, at 8 (quoting James
Madison).
162 Larry Alexander, Originalism, or Who Is Fred?  19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
321, 324 (1996), see also  Alexander, supra  note 86, at 6 (the “problem of rule-follow-
ing” is “paradoxical” because we act on the belief that we “have good moral reasons
to posit fixed rules that claim preemptive authority over our moral reasoning”).
163 This is why the challenge is not just to constitutional rules that can only be
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decision as self-government unless one is willing to equate “gov-
ernment” with submitting to a self-imposed rule and, to that ex-
tent, giving up the power to make a fresh determination on the
merits of a question.  Yet we take the view that subjecting oneself
to such rules may well be in an individual’s interest—and, in-
deed, may supply the essence of self-government.  If that is true
of all rules enacted by democratic legislatures, it is that much
more true when a super-majority vote is required to change the
rule.164
There is no question that traditional constitutionalism, con-
ceived of in significant part as limiting the power of majorities to
rule immediately as a device to secure freedom,165 is as likely to
run afoul of preferences of “conservative” advocates of democ-
racy, as it is to disappoint “liberal” advocates of nonoriginalist
judicial activism.166  But as Professor Ely observed, as to consti-
changed by super-majorities, and sometimes decades after being initially established.
It is really to the idea, even for an individual, of agreeing to be bound by any rule
that might vary from one’s current best judgment.  Thus Professor Dickerson wrote
of interpreting statutes:
To the [scholars] who believe that it is more wholesome to meet the needs
of the future than to honor the dead past, we may reply that, because legis-
lation is almost always pointed to the future, intended future results cannot
be assured unless the historical event that an enactment immediately be-
comes is later honored by the courts.  This means honoring the legislative
past.  To do otherwise would substitute the courts for the legislature in the
lawmaking process.
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 130
(1975).
164 Our tendency is to push aside the “wills of the Framers,” or “better yet” have
their wills “equated with reason, which is of course reason as we now see it.”  Alex-
ander, supra  note 162, at 324.  It is very tempting to think that this impulse against
constitutional rules concerns the time between the adopting of the Constitution and
the act of construing it.  But the clash of wills, and the temptation to resist another’s
rule, is virtually always present.
165 “Constitutional constraints and mechanisms of judicial review may be viewed,
then, as precautions that responsible rights bearers have taken against their own
imperfections.”  Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement , in PHILOSOPH-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 30, at 271, 274; see also id.  at 275 (relying on such
metaphors as Ulysses being bound to the mast, or a smoker hiding his cigarettes, to
understand the concepts of precommitment and self-government).
166 See , e.g. , Lino A. Graglia, It’s Not Constitutionalism, It’s Judicial Activism , 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 294 (1996) (arguing against perceived elitism of mod-
ern judicial activism, considering that “[t]he unhappy truth is that there is nobody
here but us, and therefore there is no alternative to majority rule except minority
rule” and that “[m]inority rule necessarily designates some individuals as politically
superior to others”).  For additional commentary on this tendency for “minimalism”
rooted in deference to democratic decision makers to slip into infidelity to constitu-
tional text and values, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Augustan Constitution and Our
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tutionalism in its traditional conception, “the judges do not check
the people, the Constitution does, which means the people are
ultimately checking themselves.”167  And despite the democratic
shortcomings of the founding period, it remains true, as Profes-
sor Amar has reminded us, that the “performative act of ordain-
ment is at the time  the most democratic and inclusive act in world
history, and is so understood by those doing it.”168
There is, then, an inevitable tension within American constitu-
tionalism between the inclination to rule by majority will and the
recognition that an acceptable individual freedom requires a
form of self-government that qualifies our commitment to major-
itarianism.169  In addition, there is at least as large a paradox in
the recognition that each individual’s attempt to maximize the
protection given to natural (or moral) human rights, by joining a
constitutional order, appears to demand renouncing the right to
make an individualized moral determination about the merits of
an apparent conflict between a claim of moral right and the re-
quirements of a given law.170  We were driven to constitutional-
ism because we perceived the need to identify appropriate limits
to civil government’s powers, in favor of human rights; but we
also know that our society in fact holds fundamental disagree-
ments about the appropriate limits to civil power.  Professor Al-
exander correctly perceives our constitutional order as centrally
the mutual acceptance “as authoritative certain methods for
resolving the uncertainty.”171
Disappointing as it may seem to modern advocates of unwrit-
Natural Rights Tradition:  Is There a Conflict? , 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 693, 701
(1995).
167 ELY, supra  note 71, at 8; see also  Grey, supra  note 1, at 705 (finding that under
traditional interpretive approaches, “when a court strikes down a popular statute or
practice as unconstitutional, it may always reply to the resulting public outcry:  ‘[w]e
didn’t do it—you did’”).
168 Amar, supra  note 46, at 35.  The framers are, notwithstanding their shortfalls,
“radical revolutionary republicans . . . who are going further than anyone has ever
gone before.” Id.  at 36.
169 As Professor Alexander observes, the “problem is not just one of constitution-
alism; it is the  problem of law,” inasmuch as it “does not depend upon whether the
practical authority is a majority or a minority, or whether it is contemporaneous or is
separated from us by 200 years and a lot of cultural change.”  Alexander, supra  note
162, at 324.
170 Id.  at 326 n.17.
171 Id.  For a great deal of thoughtful commentary, of relevance to contemporary
constitutional theory, on the difficulties of justifying political authority and the
moral obligation of individuals to obey the law, see THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW:
SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (William A. Edmundson ed., 1999).
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ten constitutionalism, the American founders were mainly anx-
ious to move us away from what they perceived as an almost
total lack of effective limitations on government.172  But it was
not their intention to give constitutional interpreters the central
role.  Assuming that most difficult questions of legal policy would
be resolved in the political process, they looked only to supple-
ment structural features of our constitutional order to assure in-
dividual constitutional rights.173  Professor Smith is right on the
mark when he observes that “[i]nstead of idealism and abstract
principle, the original Constitution was a technical document de-
voted largely to institutional structure and procedure.”174  The
Constitution, as John Patrick Diggins pointed out, “‘was deliber-
ately designed in mechanistic rather than in moral terms so that
after its enactment it would as a system function apart from
human agency.’”175
There is an acute awareness that, though we may aim for the
best, as reflected in the Constitution’s Preamble, we must take a
non-ideal human nature as a given in designing a government for
humans.176  This is why, even though he is charged with inconsis-
tency with the ideals of the framers, the central figure of early
172 Strangely enough, there is no question that the framers of the Federal Consti-
tution believed that the unwritten nature of the English constitution had contributed
to a process of avoidance of the substantive values once thought to be embodied
there. See , e.g. , McAffee. Substance Above All , supra  note 25, at 516; McAffee,
Social Contract Theory , supra  note 23, at 273-74.
173 Thus the principle draftsman of the Federal Bill of Rights, James Madison, set
out to propose only “a moderate” set of revisions, to secure “those safeguards which
[the people] have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and the
magistrate who exercises the sovereign power.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in PATTERSON, supra note 101, at 109.  Thus it is clear
that, of the many amendments proposed by various state ratifying conventions, he
“consciously omitted a significant number of non-structural popular and individual
rights proposals.”  McAffee, Substance Above All , supra  note 25, at 524 n.66.
174 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 36; see also  Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 177 (con-
cluding that “the mechanics  of the Constitution—dominate the text of the Constitu-
tion, up to and including the provisions in article V of four different ways by which
even amendments themselves may be made”).
175 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 46.
176 This is precisely why the “amending process is thus a difficult one which re-
quires supermajorities and reflects the federal nature of the U.S. Constitution.”
JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL INTERPRE-
TATIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 1 (1994).  It is also why the
“only currently applicable stated limit on the amending process” is the one “provid-
ing that states shall not be deprived of their equal representation in the Senate with-
out their consent.” Id.
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American constitutionalism should perhaps be Justice James Ire-
dell.  In rejecting Justice Chase’s call for reliance on natural law-
based limitations on government,177 even if not included in the
written Constitution, he contended that there is no fixed stan-
dard for judges to use to determine violations of natural law.178
Justice Iredell was aware of why we live in such a pluralistic soci-
ety in the first place.
Iredell’s view “implies a community of citizens who may be
committed to moral beliefs and values—but to very different and
perhaps contradictory moral beliefs and values.”179  He did not
doubt that there were natural rights, and he supported protecting
them in the Constitution; but he also understood that, as a gen-
eral charge, resolving issues of morality is “too complicated for
the Court, or anyone else for that matter, to articulate in a man-
ner at all consistent with what we demand of the Court in its
justifications for its actions.”180  Iredell would concur in the mod-
ern formulation that “[n]oninterpreting the only Constitution we
are in fact expounding,” whether because one is disgruntled with
its limited wisdom or because some provisions are genuinely in-
tractable, is not an impressive enterprise.”181
C. The Views of Modern Unwritten Constitutionalists
1. Advocates of the “Historical” Theory of the Unwritten
Constitution
Those who advanced the claim that the founding generation
believed in an unwritten Constitution put themselves in a more
awkward position for defending basic constitutional theory than
177 As a general matter, Professor Amar seems on the mark in asserting that
“Chase is hardly the most surefooted guide to the document.”  Amar, supra  note 46,
at 99.
178 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring); see
also ELY, supra  note 71, at 48-54.
179 Steven D. Smith, Moral Realism, Pluralistic Community, and the Judicial Impo-
sition of Principle:  A Comment on Perry , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 183, 189 (1993).  In
such a society, the sort of “community” involved in a constitutional order “will be
based in large measure on compromises, truces, tacit forbearances, and mutual ac-
commodations.  If someone insists on extracting from this community anything in
the nature of a ‘public philosophy,’ that philosophy will almost surely be composed
of gracious but ambiguous and even empty affirmations and of strategic silences.”
Id.
180 Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and
Epistemological Modesty , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 436, 442 (1993).
181 William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution:  The Unhelpful Contribu-
tions of Special Theories of Judicial Review , 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 232 (1983).
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they acknowledge.182  Though they appear to share with tradi-
tionalists the view that the authority of the Constitution stems
from its adoption by the people, as they were represented in state
ratifying conventions, their substantive constitutional views effec-
tively contradict the claim.183  For example, Professor Sherry
claims that the rights referred to by the Ninth Amendment are
the rights people held without such a text, derived from natural
law and the reason that animated thinking about rights under the
unwritten English constitution.184  But it is not just the content of
the rights that is derived from such substantive reasoning; it is
their very claim to holding the status of an enforceable principle
that limits governmental power.  Indeed, Professor Sherry takes
the view that these rights were so fundamental in nature that the
sovereign people lacked the power to cede them to govern-
ment—even in their written constitution.185  This is why modern
advocates of the “historical” unwritten Constitution, if they are
consistent, take the position that “the collective sovereignty of
the people—such as that which ordained the Constitution—is
limited.”186
182 For example, Professor Grey acknowledges that “[e]ven if judicial develop-
ment of an unwritten constitution is good for a country and fits an appropriate the-
ory of the judicial function, each legal system retains the choice whether to grant so
impressive a power to its judges.”  Grey, Origins , supra  note 2, at 847.  But if courts
may properly implement basic human rights that even “the people” cannot concede
to government because they are inalienable, one is left to wonder how the choice
not  to grant such a power can even be made.  There are many of us, for example,
who believe that such a judicial power was never granted in this country, but this
does not seem to influence those who think courts should hold such power.
183 Long ago, Professor Grey acknowledged that “it remains to be shown that an
acceptance of noninterpretive judicial review was consistent with” the framers’ em-
phasis on “the theory and rhetoric of popular sovereignty.” Id.  at 893.  It is my
position that noninterpretive judicial review is inconsistent with genuine popular
sovereignty, and that it is consistent has still not been shown.
184 See  Sherry, supra  note 2, at 1130-34.
185 Id.  at 1134 (state declarations of rights stated “the inherent natural rights
which formed an integral and unalterable part of the broader fundamental law”); see
also DAVID RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 220
(1989) (concluding that founders believed that “rights are not given by the Constitu-
tion,” but that republican constitutions reserved to the people “the wide range of
inalienable human rights that could not, in principle, be surrendered to the state”);
MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 19-24, 122-27; McAffee, Substance Above All , supra
note 25, at 506-07.
186 Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the “Original Intentions” of the Framers of the Con-
stitution of the United States? , 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 360 (1987).  It is this
idea that there are limits in our constitutional system to what even the sovereign
people can do that prompts Professor Sager to doubt that “majoritarianism” sup-
plies the best foundational account of the Constitution’s individual rights project.
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As soon as one takes the position that the sovereignty of the
people is limited substantively, you begin to drift toward what is
ultimately stark confusion.187  The classic example is the contem-
porary argument that the attempt to amend the Constitution to
permit the regulation or prohibition of flag burning is to run
afoul of limits imposed by the Ninth Amendment.  To burn a flag
is to engage in free speech, and it is an inalienable natural right—
one of the sorts of rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.188
Trying to reconcile this constitutional theory with a premise of
popular sovereignty, its proponent contended that such an
amendment “could have been enforced only if it had denied ex-
plicitly that speech is a natural right.”189  On this view, the people
hold constitutional authority to decide that flag burning is not the
exercise of an inalienable natural right, but lack the authority to
deny what they confess is an inalienable natural right.190  But if
the Ninth Amendment secures the right to burn a flag, because
doing so is to exercise an inalienable natural right—and, indeed,
if our Ninth Amendment theory is that some rights are “inaliena-
ble” and are not given up by their mere omission from constitu-
tional text—one wonders why it should make any difference
what “the people” think about whether flag-burning exercises a
right or whether the right is “inalienable.”191
In moral and political theory, the idea of inalienable natural
rights limits the legitimate authority of the people.192  But if the
The Ninth Amendment shows, he believes, that the Bill of Rights must be seen as
part of a larger project in political morality rather than as “disembodied acts of
capricious will that somehow gained widespread support.”  Sager, Ninth Amend-
ment , supra  note 97, at 258-59.
187 The material that appears in this article relating to the idea of a “limited”
sovereign, appears also in McAffee, Legal Enforceability , supra  note 25, at 779-83.
188 Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional? , 100 YALE
L.J. 1073 (1991).
189 Id.  at 1074.
190 This supplies an example of what Professor Smith has described as “regulatory
reason” that has slipped into “constitutional sophistry.” SMITH, supra  note 13, at 84-
124.  For a more preliminary treatment of the confusion this approach reflects and
encourages, see McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra  note 23, at 281 n.40.
191 One might just as well treat an amendment prohibiting flag-burning as implic-
itly rejecting the thesis that flag-burning is the exercise of the right of free speech—
or at least the rejection of the idea that this particular exercise of speech activity fits
into what is appropriately deemed the exercise of an “inalienable” right.
192 See, e.g.,  Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution:  The Original
“Original Intent”, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 965, 988 (1992) (concluding that
“[b]y their own understanding, [the American people] had every right to which [the
laws of nature and nature’s God] entitled them, but no right to anything to which
those self-same laws did not  entitle them”).
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founders asserted the existence of inalienable rights, they were at
least as emphatic that the power of sovereignty is unlimited.193
Consequently we can take the Constitution as declaring authori-
tatively the views of an unlimited sovereign people on the appli-
cability of a particular right, or we can view the people’s powers
as substantively limited by an “inalienable” right—but we cannot
have it both ways.194  The 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights said that “all men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights.”195
The same Declaration stated that “the community hath an indu-
bitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish government in such manner as shall be by that commu-
nity judged most conducive to the public weal.”196  The founders
viewed the Constitution as an exercise in collective self-govern-
ment.  They would also have viewed it as securing the rights the
people held and deserved.197  It would take almost two centuries
before accounts would place securing rights even ahead of the
193 See, e.g.,  2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra  note 103, at 362 (James Wilson,
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787) (asserting that right of popular
sovereignty is the people’s inalienable right, of “which no positive institution can
ever deprive them”); MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 14-15, 134-37.  For a modern
scholar who has taken such statements as precluding the possibility of a substantive
limit on the people’s power of amendment, see John R. Vile, Limitations on the
Constitutional Amending Process , 2 CONST. COMMENT. 373, 382 (1985) (concluding
that to “empower the courts to void amendments overturning judicial decisions
would surely threaten the notion of a government founded on the consent of the
governed”).
194 An attempt has been made to find a “middle ground” that does not deny the
possibility of an “unconstitutional” amendment, but would limit such a conclusion to
amendments utterly “incompatible with the assumed remainder of the Constitu-
tion.”  R. George Wright, Could a Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional? ,
22 LOY. U. L.J. 741, 764 (1991).  But even Professor Wright’s conclusion is pointedly
offered “without any reliance on natural law.” Id.
195 PA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in  5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra  note 152, at
3081, 3082.
196 Id.
197 While the theme of securing personal rights animated the pressure to add a bill
of rights to the Constitution, the debate over the inclusion of a listing of rights re-
flected a recognition that the goal was to strike the right balance between personal
rights and government’s needs.  The purpose was “‘to provide for the energy of
government on the one hand, and suitable checks on the other, to secure the rights
of particular states, and the liberties and properties of the citizens.’”  Thomas B.
McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights:  Original Understandings, Modern
Misreadings , 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 100 (1998) [hereinafter McAffee, Federal System
as Bill of Rights] (quoting Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Gov-
ernor Samuel Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in  13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 471, 471 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 1981)).
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people’s power to make fundamental decisions about their
government.198
The only way to harmonize the founders’ commitment to pop-
ular sovereignty and inalienable rights is to fully recognize the
institutional implications of one’s decision.199  A decision to
render unenumerated rights enforceable at the highest level of
generality is a decision to be ruled by judges.200  Even if we pay
appropriate lip service to the idea that those who adopted the
Constitution had authority to establish fundamental law, this will
make little difference if we also find that they delegated effective
authority for establishing governing norms to constitutional in-
terpreters—which, of course, in this country means the courts.201
The result would not be that we would live our lives protected
by natural law.  At a practical level, we would live our lives under
198 See, e.g., McAffee, Critical Guide , supra  note 100, at 93-94 (citing additional
sources); Sager, Ninth Amendment , supra  note 97, at 263.  Some of this new empha-
sis on “rights talk” reflects the need to counter what has become a modern inclina-
tion to feel and express concerns about various “anti-democratic” features of our
constitutional order—including the doctrine of judicial review. But see  Van Alstyne,
supra  note 181, at 224 (contending there is the need to recognize, and accept, “that
the institution of judicial review is  anti-democratic”).
199 For documentation of the importance attached to popular sovereignty by the
framers, see MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 125-27, 172-73, and McAffee, Substance
Above All , supra  note 25, at 519 n.56.  It is critical, in any event, to recognize that
“our choice is not between natural right and majoritarian rule,” but “one set of
human institutions and another, none of which is infallible.”  McConnell, supra  note
74, at 96.
200 As has been frequently noted, the temptation to adopt a view of judicial
supremacy, recognizing a power to amend by construction, stems in part from the
difficulty involved in amending the Constitution. See , e.g. , Brest, supra  note 14, at
236 (concluding that “the formal process of amendment is too cumbersome to bear
sole responsibility for constitutional change”); VILE, supra  note 176, at 2 (observing
that “[t]he difficulty of adopting amendments and the paucity of amendments that
have been added to the national Constitution have undoubtedly contributed to the
development of other means of peaceful constitutional adaptation”).  But this is an
area in which a delicate balance must be struck.  Nothing would diminish a constitu-
tion’s capacity to supply legal limitations as quickly as its gaining a reputation for
“the relative ease with which it can be altered.”  Van Alstyne, supra  note 34, at 181.
And nothing may have contributed to the difficulty we now face in passing amend-
ments more than the Supreme Court’s own tendency “to spin out additional, mutat-
ing ‘meanings’ from existing clauses to maintain the contemporaneity of the (now
unalterable) Constitution.”  Van Alstyne, supra  note 181, at 218.
201 See  Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:  The Essential Contra-
dictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship , 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1096 (1981)
(finding that normative theories advocated by modern scholars are vulnerable to
criticism “based on their indeterminacy, manipulability, and, ultimately, their reli-
ance on judicial value choices that cannot be ‘objectively’ derived from text, history,
consensus, natural rights, or any other source”).
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judges’ views about the requirements of natural law.  And yet
commentators have noted that in modern cases raising the most
challenging political-moral questions—especially those on abor-
tion, homosexuality, and the right to die—the treatment of the
core moral questions has been unenlightening at best.202  Moreo-
ver, contrary to widely held assumptions, the workload of the
Court and its deliberative process confirms that it is an unlikely
place to center hopes for meaningful and systematic moral dia-
logue.203  We also tend to assume that more rights invariably
translates into more freedom, which can only be good.204  But it
seems clear that the rights of some may be purchased at the cost
of great harm to the community as a whole; government does not
typically circumscribe rights solely for its own benefit, but be-
cause it believes there is sufficient justification to think the quali-
fication will promote the public good.  In short, “[i]t is hardly
clear why a collective decision in the past that a right is inaliena-
ble must control a current collective decision that it is not
inalienable.”205
As Professor Soper has recognized, under a system in which
judges feel free to implement natural law, “the system remains
positivist in the most significant sense, with the judge simply
serving as the sovereign in place of the legislature.”206  Those
who framed the Constitution thought that sovereignty rested in
the people.  Consequently “[d]epartures from the document—
amendments—are to come from the People, not from the High
Court,” because otherwise “we are left with constitutionalism
without the Constitution, popular sovereignty without the Peo-
ple.”207  Even if we see the Constitution’s purpose as being to
protect rights, or to “establish justice,” we would be better off in
the long run to also recognize the sovereignty of constitution-
makers.
The easiest way to harmonize all of this is to read the Ninth
Amendment and “inalienable rights” clauses consistently with
202 See , e.g. , McConnell, supra  note 94, at 1536-37.
203 Id.  at 1537.
204 See  Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review, Democracy, and Federalism , 1991 DET.
C. L. REV. 1349, 1350-51 (stating that rights are not “costless benefits,” but serve to
create new benefits to some interests while diminishing others; trade-offs “are neces-
sarily involved”).
205 Wright, supra  note 194, at 746.
206 Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law , 90 MICH. L. REV.
2393, 2415 (1992).
207 Amar, supra  note 46, at 84.
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the framers’ intentions.  The question is not simply whether a
right should be understood to be “inalienable,” but whether
there was sufficiently widespread agreement that it should be se-
cured by the written Constitution as a limitation on government
power enforceable by the courts.208  The framers did not equate
constitutional and “inalienable” rights and they were able to dis-
tinguish moral and legal claims.209
Sooner or later, we will have to decide which is more funda-
mental—the right to make decisions about government or the
right, in some instances, to be free of government.  We have to
do this sort of thing all the time, making particular decisions
without being guided by specific rules that clearly dictate out-
comes.  For example, courts have been given a firm and final au-
thority to interpret the Constitution, but that does not (in theory,
at least) prevent the Senate from determining that a member of
the Supreme Court has behaved so abusively in administering his
office and interpreting the Constitution that impeachment, con-
viction, and removal from office is warranted.  The possibility of
abuse of power did not prevent the founders from contemplating
a system of judicial review, but the unlikelihood of serious judi-
cial abuse of power did not keep them from providing for the
power to impeach judges if such abuse was forthcoming.  The
possibility that even impeachment authority might be abused
tells us little about whether the framers believed the balance of
risks justified their decision to grant it.  Similarly, the people of
the United States either held constitutional authority to permit
the institution of slavery, with all its tragic consequences, or they
did not; it would not make any difference whether they recog-
nized that slavery denied inalienable natural rights or rational-
ized a different view of the institution.
For the founding generation the authority of the people to de-
cide fundamental questions about government, including what
rights government officials might not intrude upon, would have
208 Modern theorists who posit overarching moral and political theories in which
constitutional rights fit “tend to ignore the character of the Constitution as a series
of complex compromises loosely knit, and only precariously held together over
time.”  Laurence H. Tribe, The Idea of the Constitution, A Metaphor-morphosis , 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 170, 172 (1987).
209 For a more complete critique of reliance on the Ninth Amendment as a justifi-
cation for a general search for inalienable, natural rights, see McAffee, Substance
Above All, supra  note 25.
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been axiomatic.210  “Both the existence of a written constitution
and the specification of a supermajority to amend it are indica-
tive of the continuing locus of sovereignty in the people them-
selves.”211  Moreover, a “constitution is in its very essence
amendable.”212  If popular sovereignty is taken seriously, it fol-
lows that “[w]hat makes a fundamental law constitutive by this
account of the constitutional enterprise also makes it amenda-
ble.”213 On this view, “[t]he authority of the constitutional order,
and thus its bindingness for all that goes on under it, is vested in
the proposition that it could be other than what it is.”214  Conse-
quently, “[c]onstitutional amendability is necessary for constitu-
tional interpretability,” given that the “possibility of amendment
inescapably implies precisely the boundedness of the constitu-
tional order at any time.”215
2. Advocates of the “Interpretive” Unwritten Constitution
To the extent that advocates of “interpretive” open-ended con-
stitutionalism  accept the historical claims advanced by those who
contend that text and history demand that we look beyond con-
stitutional text,216 they wind up at the same place as the more
historically-oriented unwritten constitutionalists on the matter of
popular sovereignty.  The tendency in both cases is to pay appro-
priate lip service to the idea that those who adopted the Consti-
tution had authority to establish fundamental law.  But in fact,
they delegated effective authority for establishing governing
norms to constitutional interpreters—which, of course, in this
country means the courts.  In theory at least, advocates of the
“historical” thesis have suggested that the founding generation
drew an important distinction between individual rights, which
were subject to analysis as part of the “unwritten” Constitution,
210 For a criticism of the modern view that the founding generation would have
viewed some rights as beyond the power of the people to amend, see MCAFFEE,
supra  note 25, at 19-24, 122-27.
211 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 130.
212 WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 178 (1992).  An
implication is that “Article V cannot be used to make an irrevocable amendment.”
Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time:  A Very Different and “Irrevocable” Thirteenth
Amendment 40 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
213 HARRIS, supra  note 212, at 164-65.
214 Id.  at 165.
215 Id.
216 See supra  text accompanying note 45 (citing works by “interpretive” open-
ended constitutionalists who appear to accept claims of advocates of unwritten con-
stitutionalism on historical grounds).
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and provisions that allocated governmental power.217  Depend-
ing on the theory one adopted for interpreting provisions allocat-
ing governmental power,218 you could justify historically a less
creative approach.
Among advocates of the “interpretive” unwritten Constitu-
tion, there is occasional acknowledgment that “the Constitution
originates in an act of deliberate public choice and remains
subordinate to that authority”; consequently, it is clear that it
“cannot fully embody reason in public affairs.”219  That being
said, however, advocates of the interpretive unwritten Constitu-
tion make it clear that they reject any view that “it is the majority
that is the source of rights and other political values, not nature
or some authority higher than the majority.”220  But the assump-
tion of our constitutional order is precisely that “the people”
made a decision that certain rights and other political values de-
served the security of constitutional protection; if the framers
were committed to natural rights and other political values, they
were at least as committed to the idea that the decision to give
those values the weight of constitutional status was a decision
that had to be made by the people as a sovereign whole.
Advocates of the “interpretive” unwritten Constitution thus
become constitutional textualists, arguing that generally worded
guarantees are properly read as reflecting the assumption of a
moral reality that might progressively be understood more ade-
quately.  What unwritten constitutionalists seem to forget is that
“the founders did not seek to govern us from beyond the graves,”
but “to secure for us the right to govern ourselves.”221  Thus
“[b]y accepting the authoritativeness of the Constitution, we ac-
cept our right to devise a new constitution and incidentally be-
come authors of the old.”222  What this means in practice is that
217 See MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 19-20.
218 The best evidence we have is that the founding generation saw the project of
interpreting the Constitution largely in originalist terms, so that would be the logical
place to begin. See , e.g. , SMITH, supra  note 13, at 47 (the founders’ project was
“inherently originalist in its basic orientation”); BASSHAM, supra  note 82, at 70
(“The available evidence indicates quite clearly that while the framers disagreed
about which form of originalism judges should adopt, there was general agreement
that nonoriginalist modes of adjudication were improper.”).
219 BARBER, supra  note 5, at 64.
220 Id.  at 11.
221 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 144; see also  Richard S. Kay, Book Review ,
10 CONN. L. REV. 801, 805 (1978).
222 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 144.
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there is “agreement among diverse parties with real and separate
interests,” and that the agreement reflects the “capacity to com-
promise and to make trade-offs” far more than an ability to exist
“as a single unitary social organism.”223
III
THE COMMITMENT TO A CONSTITUTION OF
FIXED NORMS
Effective limits on government cannot be subject to unpredict-
able change.  If I request you to behave according to rules 1, 2,
and 3 but conceal the content of those rules until you trans-
gress them, I cannot hope to influence your conduct to con-
form to the model I have in mind.  Limited government
requires that at a particular point in history the limits are de-
cided upon and remain relatively fixed.  At the least, change in
the limits must be prospective.  It was this idea which caused
the founders of the government to insist with such emphasis
on a fixed constitution as the surest security for liberty.224
Samuel Adams contended that “vague and uncertain laws, and
more especially constitutions, are the very instruments of
slavery.”225
A. The Founders’ Efforts
In the period leading to the American Revolution, the colo-
nists “complained that their constitutions were subject ‘to a per-
petual mutability .’”226  The framers understood that limited
government “presupposes the articulation and preservation of
knowable, stable, limiting rules.”227  One of the founders’ goals
in drafting constitutions became the establishment of knowable,
and fixed, rules.228  It is natural that it would, for part of “[t]he
concept of a written constitution is that it defines the authority of
government and its limits, that government is the creature of the
constitution and cannot do what it does not authorize and must
223 Id.  at 149.
224 Kay, supra  note 221, at 805.
225 3 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 262 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1968).
226 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 237 n.20 (quoting JACK P. GREENE, PERIPH-
ERIES AND CENTER 54 (1986)).
227 Kay, supra  note 221, at 805.
228 See , e.g. , South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (concluding
that inasmuch as the Constitution “is a written instrument, its meaning does not
alter” that “which it meant when adopted it means now”); Kay, supra  note 30, at 17
(concluding that constitutionalism reflects a judgment “that effective constitutional
limits require the promulgation of fixed rules”).
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not do what it forbids”; it follows that “‘[a ] priori , such a consti-
tution could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if it were
to fulfill its function.’”229
The framers recognized that the goal of preserving political
freedom would be furthered by clear rules.  In their minds,
“[a]ny particular exercise of power is less threatening if it occurs
within preexisting known limits.”230  “[A] constitutionally de-
fined government with extensive granted powers is, in some
ways, less dangerous than a weak government whose powers are
not defined by prior law.”231  It became commonplace to quote
Montesquieu:  “Political liberty consists in security, or at least, in
the opinion we have of security.”232
The founders were aware that an implication of their commit-
ment to knowable, fixed rules would be an inflexibility that might
on occasion result in “suboptimal public responses to change.”233
With this inflexibility would come greater security.  The central
purpose of the written constitution was “to reduce uncertainty
and create stability,” providing “something tangible to which the
judiciary could refer in recalling the legislature to basic princi-
ples.”234  Even though government response to perceived needs
might be less flexible, the risk of unpredictable action that
threatened freedom would be reduced.  A “written constitution,
properly construed, serves as a reminder and a barrier, con-
straining politics within a relatively narrow range of deliberately
chosen rights, powers, and institutions.”235
B. The Views of Modern Unwritten Constitutionalists on
“Historical” Grounds
A premise of historically grounded unwritten constitutionalists
229 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 56 (quoting PHILIP KURLAND, WATERGATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978)).
230 Kay, supra  note 30, at 22.
231 Id.  Professor Kay powerfully observes that:
Our picture of the totalitarian state is associated with the surprise knock on
the door that can come on any day at any hour, by the threat of punish-
ment for the violation of standards of conduct that were different or un-
known before enforcement, with official behavior that is uncontrolled by
any preexisting patterns or restraints.  This kind of existence is like a jour-
ney, full of dangerous obstacles and risks, undertaken in total darkness.
Id.  at 23.
232 Id.
233 Id.  at 24.
234 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 60.
235 Id.  at 53.
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is that natural law-based individual rights limitations on govern-
ment power were not conceived to be subjected to the flexibility
of positive law constitutional change. The assumption is that such
rights are so fundamental as to be inalienable and are therefore
beyond the reach of even the sovereign people.  Apart from the
historical responses to such claims that have already been elabo-
rated,236 it is theoretically odd that the popular sovereign would
lack the authority to amend the Constitution so as to surrender
an “inalienable” right, but would have authority to grant federal
courts the power to establish or disestablish such rights as en-
forceable limitations.  If Justice Marshall’s claim that judges are
bound to enforce the fundamental law of the written Constitu-
tion inevitably produced controversy, one can imagine the re-
sponse to the claim that judges are bound generally to enforce
the unwritten law of nature.  And if judicial review has generated
some controversy from its beginnings, even when the Court is
purporting to require compliance with written law, the modern
Court’s claim of a right to enforce non-interpretive conclusions
about the requirements of nature has yielded a firestorm of
controversy.237
It is critical to realize that “the doctrine of the living constitu-
tion is vacuous because there can be no agreement on the guid-
ing principle of the constitutional evolution that the doctrine
posits.”238  As a consequence, we wind up with a theoretical limit
on the power even of the sovereign people, in the form of “unal-
terable” and “inalienable” rights, and yet even these rights are
subjected to the prospect of being recognized or not depending
on the insight of members of the Supreme Court.  This is why the
“written constitutionalism of the founding” had “an antievolutio-
nary purpose,” under which every question of government power
and individual rights does not become “an open question.”239
The assumption that individual rights guarantees are part of an
unalterable fundamental law, moreover, presumes that the dis-
tinction between individual rights guarantees and mere structural
236 For a criticism of the modern view that the founding generation would have
viewed some rights as beyond the power of the people to amend, see MCAFFEE,
supra  note 25, at 19-24, 122-27.
237 For an extremely useful analysis of the modern Court’s efforts at giving effect
to the concept of unenumerated fundamental rights as limitations on government
power, see SMITH, supra  note 13.
238 BELZ, supra  note 21, at 250.
239 Id.
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provisions will be clear and relatively obvious.  But this has never
been true.  Both the Virginia and Massachusetts state constitu-
tions of revolutionary America included provisions requiring
separation of powers in their Declarations of Rights.240  And Jus-
tice Marshall was almost certainly correct, even though the deci-
sion generated some controversy even in its day, in holding on
structural grounds that the limitations in the Bill of Rights did
not apply to the states.241  Modern unwritten constitutionalism
falls into the same trap that a good deal of modern constitutional
thought has fallen into.  As Professor Amar has so eloquently
elaborated, it required the modern era for us to arrive at the
point where we could hear the claim by a leading scholar that
“the assertion that federalism was meant to protect . . . individual
constitutional freedoms . . . has no solid historical or logical
basis.”242
Fundamental decisions about personal human rights, as well as
questions about governmental authority, including basic ques-
tions about the power to balance the needs of the larger commu-
nity and the claims of individuals, require thoughtful
consideration by a constitution’s framers.  Either can involve dif-
ficult and subtle questions about competing claims and interests
as well as a consideration of who is most likely to give them ap-
propriate weight.  Imagine finding yourself in the position that
judicial freedom to consider underlying policy questions turned
on the nature of your constitutional claim.  Imagine, for example,
making the claim that a President lacked constitutional authority
to commit us to war—a challenge by a draftee to the Vietnam
War, as an example.  A modern “unwritten” constitutionalist on
“historical” grounds would have to acknowledge that it was a
claim about the allocation of power, not an individual rights
claim, even though the evidence shows that the framers were try-
ing to “chain the dog of war”—presumably to avoid needlessly
sending Americans to fight and die.243
Or imagine an individual claiming on federalism-based
240 See MCAFFEE, supra  note 25, at 25 (noting this as “a fact which reflects the
framers’ recognition of the connection between governmental structure and the
preservation of liberty”).
241 See AMAR, supra  note 105, at 33, 128.
242 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 244 (1980),
quoted in AMAR, supra  note 105, at 129.
243 See generally FRANCIS WORMUTH & EDWIN FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF
WAR:  THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (1986).
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grounds that Congress lacked the authority to compel service by
means of a formal military draft.244  While Sherry does not pro-
vide much help on what canons of interpretation she would em-
ploy in cases concerning the allocation of government power, the
claimant would presumably be limited by the decision embodied
in the text of the Constitution.245  On the other hand, one chal-
lenging a restriction on their decision about obtaining an abor-
tion would be free to contend that legal restrictions violated their
moral rights, quite apart from any decision ever made by the sov-
ereign or embodied in any text.  If the Supreme Court ever
adopted the unwritten Constitution expressly, it would have
quite a job on its hand to explain its freedom in some cases but
not in others.
C. The Views of Modern “Interpretive”
Unwritten Constitutionalists
Based on either the text itself, or occasionally on the develop-
ment of precedent, some contend that we do simply have an “un-
written” Constitution in the sense that elaborating constitutional
law involves the Supreme Court in the process of law creation.
A consequence is that “in the writings of prominent constitu-
tional scholars . . . the original Constitution virtually disappears”
as the focus is placed on elaborating individual rights principles
that are taken as calling for creative construction.246  A question
raised is whether there is a remedy to be had in amending the
Constitution, or whether there is really such a need.
The need is arguably presented by the willingness of commen-
tators to wrest the founders’ words to move away from a Consti-
tution of fixed meaning.  For example, a statement made by
Edmund Pendleton has been used to support the unenumerated
rights interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.  In opposing the
proposed Bill of Rights, Pendleton said:  “Again is there not dan-
ger in the Enumeration of Rights?  May we not in the progress of
things, discover some great and Important [right], which we don’t
now think of?”247  The statement is used to support not only an
244 See , e.g. , Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution:  The Original Un-
derstanding , 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493 (1969).
245 For some help on the underlying constitutional issues, see McAffee, Constitu-
tional Interpretation , supra  note 70, at 288 & n.79, and McAffee, Indeterminacy ,
supra  note 14, at 432-34.
246 SMITH, supra  note 13, at 53.
247 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), re-
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unenumerated rights interpretation of the Ninth Amendment,
but to support the idea that the protected rights might legiti-
mately evolve over time.  But the statement is taken out of
context.
In fact, Pendleton first asserts that the peoples’ rights are best
protected on “the Broad and sure ground of this Principle—that
the people being Established in the Grant itself as the Fountain
of Power, retain every thing which is not granted.”248  Then, after
raising the concern that important rights might not be included in
the proposed Bill of Rights, he observes that “[t]here the princi-
ple may be turned upon Us, and what is not reserved, said to be
granted:  If therefore Gentlemen think something should be
done, it would seem to me more proper to do as Massachusetts
proposes—Declare the Principle—as more safe than the Enu-
meration [of rights].”249  His point is clearly that a listing of rights
jeopardizes the basic theory of the Federal Constitution, based
on the scheme of protection of rights through limited and enu-
merated powers, and not that a listing of rights might generate
rigid positivism in construing the Constitution.
The net result is that we now have a Constitution that contin-
ues to be construed by the Supreme Court as issuing it a general
power to determine whether governmental entities have crossed
some open-ended line and violated the moral rights of citizens.
The “good news,” if you want to call it that, is that the Court has
shown a moderate amount of self-restraint in determining when
that line has been crossed.250  In addition, it is fair to say that the
Court has not been subjected to a careful scrutinizing on the un-
derlying issue inasmuch as most of its misunderstanding has been
promoted by individuals who are among our most thoughtful le-
gal scholars.251  If the Court has erred, it has made mistakes that
have been with us almost from the beginning, and we ought to be
sympathetic with the view that the Court “should not be held to
printed in  2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON 530, 532-33 (David
John Mays ed., 1967).
248 Id.  at 532.
249 Id.  at 533.
250 See , e.g. , supra  notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
251 BELZ, supra  note 21, at 239 (stating that “[i]n American law schools there
seems to be an inexhaustible supply of partisans of judicial governance”).  What is
striking, however, is that most of the views expressed are “systematically opposed to
popular self-government,” notwithstanding that popular sovereignty is one of the
underpinnings of our constitutional order. Id.  at 240.
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an excessive standard of certainty.”252
Even though the “adoption of a written constitution can be
understood as establishing a fixed rule that does not change over
time except through written amendment and a fundamental law
capable of providing judicial instruction,”253 the interpretive pro-
cess is bound to be a human one that will not automatically yield
correct results.  The need for constitutional amendment, or other
strong responses, would require a just conclusion that the courts
are so strongly predisposed to an unwritten Constitution that
they will not listen to effective argument making the case that it
cannot be reconciled with the Constitution as an exercise in
meaningful self-government.  But if anything is clear, it is that
“[t]here is no war between text and intent, and one may quite
comfortably be a ‘textualist’ who is seeking the text’s originally
intended meaning by examining the text in a relevant con-
text.”254  The main point “is to keep the balance true:  we want to
implement the will of the people acting through their agents, but
it is only the will they embody in the written Constitution that is
authoritative.”255
CONCLUSION
Our goal is not to have members of the Supreme Court “sim-
ply look to what they or their predecessors have declared funda-
mental in self-absorbed opinions” but to embrace “a more
attractive and document-supported approach.”256  When it is all
said and done, those who advocate a fairly traditional view of
what it means to interpret the Constitution are simply asking
courts to remember that “the framers of the constitution contem-
plated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts , as
well as of the legislature.”257
252 WHITTINGTON, supra  note 15, at 61.
253 Id.
254 McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism , supra  note 14, at 644.
255 Id.
256 Amar, supra  note 46, at 124.
257 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).
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